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POLICYMAKING AS POWER-BUILDING
*

K. SABEEL RAHMAN

The problem of balancingpower through institutionaldesign-alwaysa
centralconcern ofconstitutional theory-has taken on even greatersalience
in current scholarship in light of contemporary concerns over economic
inequality and failures of American democracy today. This paper extends
these concerns into the realm of administrative law and the design of

regulatorypolicy. I argue that in an era of increasing (and increasingly
interrelated) economic and political inequality, we must design public
policies not only with an eye towards their substantive merits, but also in

ways that redress disparitiesofpower In particular we can design policies
to institutionalize the countervailingpower of constituencies that are often
the beneficiariesofegalitarianeconomic policies, yet lack the durable, longterm political influence to sustain and help implement these policies over
time.
This concept of "policymakingaspower-building"rests on a descriptive
and normative claim. Descriptively, the paper shows how historical and
contemporary analyses of administrative governance indicates that
regulatory institutions and policies are already involved in shaping and
respondingto the balance ofpower among civil society groups. Normatively,

the paper argues that this reality should be harnessedto pro-actively design
policies that mitigate power disparities, and in so doing promote greater

democratic responsiveness through regulatory policy design. The paper
develops this argument through case studies of power-balancing policy
design in local regulatory bodies around economic development initiatives,
and infederal regulationaroundthe case offinancial reform. The paper then
theorizes a more general framework for designing similar power-shifting
policies that are portable across substantive areas of law and policy and
across federal, state, or local level administration. This framework should
be of interest to policymakers, advocacy groups, and other practitioners
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designing regulatorypolicies and concerned about dangers of capture and
disparateinfluence.
This account ofpolicymaking as power-buildingsynthesizes literatures
in law, socialscience, andpolitical theory to offer a more institutionally-rich
account of power and the interactions between constituencies on the one
hand andpolicymaking institutions on the other It also extends the current
debates on power andpublic law, law and inequality, and administrativeand
local government law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of power-and in particular, balancing the differential
power of different factions to preserve effective, accountable, and responsive
republican government-has always been a central concern of constitutional
and public law. In today's era of growing economic inequality, these age-old
concerns about how institutional structures allocate power and protect
against potentially excess influence of any one faction have become a
renewed area of concern for scholars of constitutional law, public law, and
law and inequality.' Indeed, a wide body of social science research has
documented that economic wealth in particular generates troubling
disparities in political power and influence, thereby skewing our ordinary
processes of democratic governance: legislation is empirically more

1.
See e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, The Anti-OligarchyConstitution,94 B.U. L. REV.
669, 671 (2014); Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & the Constitution of
Opportunity, (Univ. of Texas Law, Public Law Research No. UTPUB632) (Forthcoming, 2018)
https://ssm.com/abstract-2620920; GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017); Kate Andrias,

Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 J. CONST. L. 419 (2016);
Daryl Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 33 (2015); Ganesh
Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in ConstitutionalTheory, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1445 (2016).
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responsive to the preferences of wealthier citizens; 2 legislators themselves
are dependent on campaign funders and donors rather than constituents for
winning office; 3 organized business interests have proven more resourced
and sophisticated in building an influence ecosystem of lobbying, advocacy,
and model legislation bodies that have major impact on state, local and
federal legislatures, as well as regulatory bodies;' the shared social and
cultural background among legislators, regulators, and economic elites
induces more elite-friendly policies.s
But the challenge of mitigating these disparities of political power is not
just a question of macro-level constitutional or structural institutional design.
Rather, public policy itself plays a role in shaping the balance of power
between different constituencies in civil society-and their relative ability to
exercise power and influence on public policy in the future. This powershifting dimension of policy design is often overlooked in more
substantively-oriented policy discussions. But a self-conscious use of policy
design to balance disparities of political power can play an important role in
these larger conversations about power, public law, and inequality today.
This is what I call in this paper policymaking as power-building. I argue
below that in an era of increasing (and increasingly interrelated) economic
and political inequality, we must design public policies not only with an eye
toward their substantive merits, but also in ways that rebalance disparities of
power. In particular, public policy should be aimed at institutionalizing the
countervailing power of constituencies that are often the beneficiaries of
egalitarian economic policies, yet lack the durable, long-term political
influence.
Specifically, this paper makes three main arguments and contributions.
First, the paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding power
and power-building, drawing on and contributing to an overlapping set of
literatures in public law, administrative law, social movements, and social
science. In so doing, the paper develops implications for public law debates,
policymakers, and social movement actors alike. Specifically, I suggest that
2.
See generally LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE (2010); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012). Martin Gilens & Benjamin Page, Testing Theories ofAmerican
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, andAverage Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014); Benjamin Page,
et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferencesof Wealthy Americans, II PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013).
See generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS3.
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN'S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (Hary. U. Press Eds., 2014).
See generally, Alex Hertel-Femandez, How the Right Trounced Liberals in the States, 39
4.
DEMOCRACY J. (Winter 2016), http://democracyjoumal.org/magazine/39/how-the-right-trouncedliberals-in-the-states/; JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010).
5.
See generally, Nicholas Carnes, WHITE COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS
IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING (2014).
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power distributions are not an intrinsic property of pure institutional design
or of raw interest group resources. Rather, power is relational,emerging out
from the dynamics of how civil society groups interface or interact with
policymaking institutions. It is by altering and reshaping this state-society
linkage that institutions create new forms and distributions of power.
Second, I argue that this power-building orientation to policy and
institutional design is of particular relevance in context of regulatory
institutions and the administrative process. While we are accustomed to a
long-standing debate about regulatory constraint and discretion, the
relationship of administrative agencies to the separation of powers, and the
balance between expertise and public input in regulatory policymaking,
viewing the administrative process as a mode of constructing-and
potentially remedying-power disparities suggests some valuable new
approaches to policy and regulatory design. The administrative process is
already one of more flexible and fluid public law arenas in which to
experiment with approaches to balancing political power.' Nor is this
administrative focus limited to the federal arena; arguably some of the most
compelling experiments in administrative power-balancing has been taking
place at the state and local level.' This orientation towards power provides a
distinct lens that recasts and repurposes existing literatures in administrative
law, to better address problems of inclusion, accountability, responsiveness,
and above all, political power.
Third, the paper outlines a more generalizable toolkit through which
policies can be designed to empower key constituencies, and to mitigate
disparities of political power. This toolkit is also portable-easily applied to
policy contexts from federal, state, or local arenas-and trans-substantiveadaptable in different policy areas.
Highlighting and developing this strategy of power-building through
policy design offers several valuable implications. For policymakers, these
ideas could inform regulatory policies and designs that help mitigate
disparities of influence, particularly between more well-connected and
resourced interest groups and more diffuse or disempowered constituencies.
For advocacy groups, these ideas suggest a way to strategically design public
policy and regulatory initiatives in ways that forge tighter links to
constituencies that may benefit from key policies, but might otherwise be
6.
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 1, at 142. Levinson suggests this in his piece, but does not fully
explore the larger implications of what power-balancing might mean as a serious guiding principle in

administrative policy and institutional design.
7.

Administrative law scholars are only just beginning to mine the diverse experiences of state

and local administrative processes for larger implications for public law concerns. See generally, Nestor
Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017); Miriam Siefter, Gubernatorial
Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483 (2017).
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politically ill-equipped to defend them from rollback. If legal and social
science scholarship have documented how economic inequality and political
inequality reinforce one another as politically-powerful actors push for
policies that exacerbate inequality, this paper suggests a way towards the
inverse dynamic: in which policies aimed at promoting economic equality
are made more durable and effective through policy designs that help create
more political equality.
These arguments are of particular concern in light of both the growing
importance of regulatory agencies in driving the larger policy debates, and
how this increased centrality of regulation places previous waves of
regulatory process reform under strain. As this paper will suggest, as an
empirical matter, federal regulatory agencies are already central to major
policy initiatives, even above and beyond formal actions of Congress. This
is in part because of the accumulation of delegations of agency authority, and
in part because of the political incentives to make policy through the
Executive Branch in the face of either divided government where different
parties control the White House and the Congress, or sclerosis and gridlock
within Congress itself-or both. The administrative state has long been
subject to waves of institutional process reform from the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act to more recent attempts at leveraging new
technological and online tools to improve agency processes. But the practical
and political stakes of regulatory judgment today suggests the need for more
far-reaching institutional design approaches.
The paper develops this argument in part through two empirical case
studies. First, the paper looks at power-building policy designs that have
been innovated in context of local-level battles between politically-powerful
developers on the one hand, and less-influential community organizations
representing residents and workers on the other. These community groups
are often on the losing side of policy fights in the city-particularly in highgrowth, gentrifying areas. Yet, as documented below, policymakers and
advocacy groups in some places like Oakland have begun experimenting
with a novel approach: in addition to securing substantive policy
commitments on issues like labor standards and community benefits, these
policymakers have created new administrative bodies to oversee
development projects. Crucially these commissions are designed to magnify
and institutionalize the political influence of those local communities and
labor groups that are often outgunned and overlooked in battles with more
resourced and influential developer interest groups. 8
Second, the paper draws out further lessons about power-shifting policy
designs from the realm of administrative law and post-financial crisis

8.

See infra Part I.B.
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regulatory reform debates. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, in particular, created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, which has operated since its inception not only as a major
policy innovator on consumer finance issues; it has also served as a conduit
for engaging and empowering traditionally diffused, under-resourced, and
marginalized stakeholders in an area of law and policy-financial
regulation-more readily dominated by established business interests.9
Both of these case studies are prime examples of policymaking as powerbuilding: the designing of institutions, policies, and processes aimed not to
just to achieve policies that mitigate economic inequality, but also to address
a background disparity of power and influence. In both examples we see a
key stakeholder community that is historically undermanned and less
influential than the more resourced and sophisticated industry playersresidents and labor groups against developers, or consumers against the
financial sector-benefiting from institutions and policies designed in part
to place these constituencies on more equal footing. These case studies
illustrate how power disparities might be mitigated through regulatory and
administrative institutions or processes; and how these efforts might be more
or less successful depending on context and design choices. In developing
this argument, this paper adds to parallel literature developed in areas like
labor law and criminal justice reform, where scholars are similarly concerned
by the need to mitigate deep inequalities in power.'o
To these accounts, this paper adds a further dimension of exploring how
power disparities can potentially be mitigated specifically through
regulatory processes, particularly in the case of economic policy making.
Indeed, this approach extends the recent concerns of public law scholars like
Daryl Levinson, Kate Andrias, Ganesh Sitaraman and others about how
constitutional structures fail to balance disparities of power particularly in
the face of economic inequality with respect to the sub-constitutional realm
of policy design-specifically, the structuring of administrative and
regulatory institutions and processes. While we have a robust tradition of
examining questions of political power in constitutional law-from classic
accounts of Madisonian republicanism to doctrinal traditions of political
process theory-these same concerns are in many ways better addressed
through the more granular and day-to-day work of regulation and policy
design. As this paper will argue, the front-lines for attempts to rebalance
power, particularly over economic policymaking, often manifests in the
9.
10.

See infra Part HI.A.
See generally, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); Jocelyn

Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016); Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal
Justice Through Contestationand Resistance, 111 Nw. L. REV. 1609 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Libertarian
CorporatismIs Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (2016).
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realm of administrative and local government law-the public law structures
that shape more prosaic and day-to-day interactions between stakeholders,
interest groups, and policymaking institutions.
In extending the questions of power and structure from constitutional to
the administrative arena, this paper also reframes some of the conventional
accounts in administrative and local government law. Administrative law
literature has perennially been concerned about questions of agency
authority, discretion, and constraint, while local government law has often
addressed questions of city power and structure. This paper draws out a
related, but different set of concerns. How do administrative institutional
designs and processes (whether at the federal, state, or local level) shape the
terrain of power and influence among civil society groups themselves? How
might these administrative structures be reformulated to better balance the
power dynamics between competing interests and constituencies? The goal
here is not so much a content-neutral, trans-substantive view of institutional
authority and accountability per se, but rather a focus on how these
institutional arrangements can be leveraged to mitigate pre-existing
disparities in power and influence among different stakeholder and civil
society groups. The paper proceeds as follows.
Part II develops the case for approaching power-building through
regulatory agencies and policies. This Part offers a descriptive claim that
both historical and contemporary analyses of the regulatory state indicate
that regulatory agencies and processes already play a major role in
responding to civil society constituencies and pressures in ways that can alter
the background balance of power between these groups. Part III advances a
complementary normative claim. This Part suggests that the administrative
state can offer affirmative democracy-enhancing and power-balancing
benefits-in contrast to its usual characterization as an apolitical, neutral, or
technocratic domain. This reality outstrips some of the existing frameworks
of regulatory process reform and redesign, suggesting the need for a more
thorough approach to assuring balanced accountability of and participation
in regulatory processes. Part IV turns to case studies of local economic
development and federal financial regulatory reform, examples of deliberate
attempts at power-building policy and institutional design in the
administrative state. These examples offer insight into institutional design
strategies that can be employed to reform administrative processes to proactively address disparities of power and influence.
Part V then draws on these empirical accounts to extract some general
tools, strategies, and approaches through which administrative processes can
be adapted to mitigate power disparities across issue areas and levels of
government. Part VI explores some broader theoretical and scholarly
implications for debates over democratic theory and institutional design.
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This Part also explores broader implications of these arguments for scholarly
debate, in particularly highlighting lessons for current scholarship in
administrative law, law and social movements, and the emerging scholarship
on both power and inequality. Finally, Part VII concludes with some broader
reflections on our understandings of democracy and the regulatory state.
H. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND PROCESS
Administrative law and the administrative process represents a domain
where these power-shifting concepts can have real effect in balancing
disparities of political power." The literature on participation, institutional
design, and the regulatory state is vast, and it has often revolved around
perennial questions of agency restraint and discretion-and the implications
for constitutional, legal, or political legitimacy.12 But it is also true that the
administrative process already represents a more fluid and dynamic
institutional context in which these questions of balancing power can be
answered. Levinson himself notes waves of administrative law innovationfrom judicial process review aimed at limiting regulatory capture to designs
for institutional reforms within agencies themselves 3 -as one of the areas
of public law most attuned to questions of power. This is partly true, and
partly misleading. As this Part will suggest, it is very much the case that the
regulatory state is in fact an arena in which politics takes place, just on
different terms from what we might see in a more familiar electoral,
legislative, or advocacy context. The power implications of regulatory
institutions and processes has periodically provoked waves of institutional
reform attempts at assuring procedural fairness, agency responsiveness, and
accountability-previewing today's concerns about agency authority,
capture, and the need to balance power and influence.

11.
For an account of power, social movements, and the administrative state, see K. SABEEL
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 143-46 (2017). It should be noted that this theorization
of power-building outlined above need not be limited to the context of state institutions. Arguably, similar

concerns can shape strategies for building and exercising power against other decision-making
institutions, such as private actors and corporations. Indeed, many corporate responsibility and social
justice campaigns face difficulties along these exact lines. These movements face challenges in

identifying the locus of real decision-making power in an era where corporations and employers are
themselves controlled by layers of financial investors and umbrella companies-and where outside
stakeholders tend to lack levers through which to exert influence and pressure.
12.
See Jon D. Michaels, OfConstitutional Custodiansand Regulatory Rivals: An Account ofthe

Old andNew Separation ofPowers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2016) ("The study of American public
administration often zeroes in on questions of control. Who should direct, guide, or check our vast and
powerful administrative agencies-and in what ways? These questions have long been, and continue to
be, pressing ones for practical, normative, and constitutional reasons.").

13.

Levinson, supranote 1, at 112-18.
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A. AGENCY AUTHORITY AND REGULATORY REFORM

In recent years, federal administrative agencies have come to play an
outsized role in public policy disputes. 14 In part this is a byproduct of the
accumulation of decades of broad statutory delegations from Congress. But
it is also a result of the political dynamics of an increasingly polarized
political climate. Thus, in periods of divided government, Presidents have
incentives to drive policy agendas through regulation rather than through a
hostile Congress. This is precisely the case in the later years of the Obama
administration, which produced major battles over administrative authority
arising, for example, out of the Deferred Action immigration reforms, the
EPA's Clean Power Plan, and the Department of Labor's overtime pay
rule-each of which were subjected to major litigation and court injunctions.
But such expanded regulatory policymaking is also very much present in
context of unified party control of Washington as well. Thus, the early
months of the Trump Administration, despite a favorable Republican control
of both Houses of Congress, has generated similarly explosive opposition to
major agency-driven initiatives on immigration policy and elsewhere.
For some legal scholars and practitioners, this centrality of
administrative authority is an indication of the need to revisit the basic
constitutional position of administrative agencies." Justice Clarence Thomas
has expressed a willingness to reconsider basic administrative law doctrines
of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law,16 as has the newest
Justice Neil Gorsuch. Republicans in Congress have also proposed
legislation attempting to undo this practice of judicial deference.17 Such a
wholesale restraint of the administrative state seems both difficult to
implement and unwise; the realities of modern governance and policymaking
depends critically on agency policymaking and the division of labor between
legislative and regulatory bodies.
14.

See generally, e.g., Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and

Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (noting the broad accumulation of regulatory authority,
further expanded by features like regulatory waivers and accreted de facto delegation from overlapping
statutory authorizations). On the role of agencies as primary policymakers in conditions of divided
government and Congressional gridlock, see generally, e.g., Cynthia Farina & Gillian Metzger,
Introduction: The Place ofAgencies in PolarizedGovernment, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1683 (2015); Jody

Freeman & David Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Abbe Gluck,
Comment, The Supreme Court 2014 Term: Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress'sPlan in the Eraof UnorthodoxLawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015); Thomas McGarity,

Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly PartisanAge, 61 DUKE L. J. 1671 (2012);
Gillian Metzger, Agencies, Polarizationand the States, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1739 (2015).
15.
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).

See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also U.S.
16.
Aid Funds v. Bryana Bible, 807 F.3d 839, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting the importance of revisiting principles of Seminole Rock and Auer Deference).

See Separation of Powers Restoration and Second Amendment Protection Act, S. 2434, 114th
17.
Cong. (2nd Sess. 2015-2016).
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But it is also the case that the recurring concerns with agency authority
have fueled waves of legal and institutional reform aimed at improving the
balance of expertise and accountability within the regulatory state itself.18
The early battles over the constitutionality of the New Deal administrative
state eventually produced foundational case law confirming the agency's
constitutional status, as well as the landmark Administrative Procedure
Act." In the 1970s, a new wave of public interest legislation in areas like
environmental law and consumer protection created another wave of
expanded agency authorities and responsibilities. This expansion of agency
authority came with parallel efforts to deepen agency accountability, through
transparency measures like the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), and
the rise of "interest representation" in the regulatory process. 20 These
accountability regimes, notably, evinced a greater skepticism on the part of
reformers about the public interestedness of agencies, seeking to prevent
special interest influence and regulatory capture, even as they sought to
expand agency authority at the same time.
While concerns about agency authority grew in the late 1970s and into
the 1980s, driving a shift towards deregulation, 2 1 regulatory reform in the
1990s and early 2000s took a different valence, seeking not to expand
external forms of accountability through participation or transparency, but
rather to invest in internal forms of rationalization and oversight of agency
action through the institutionalization of mechanisms for cost-benefit
analysis, and a deeper commitment to presidential control of
administration. 22 These new measures absorbed the "Chicago School"
critiques of regulatory capture and market efficiency into an attempt to make
regulation smarter, more rational, and more effective. 23 This rationalizing
and expertise-enhancing ethos has continued in more recent years as
regulatory reform has increasingly drawn on advances in "civic technology,"
18.

See Reuel Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the

ChangingDefinition ofPluralism, 1945-1970,53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1410-16 (2000); Reuel Schiller,
The Era ofDeference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence ofNew DealAdministrativeLaw, 106 MICH.

L. REV. 399, 399-341 (2007); see generally Robert Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective,
38 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1986).
19.
See e.g. Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court's

Accommodation ofProgressiveLegal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1567 (2011).
20.

See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88

HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975); Thomas Merrill, CaptureTheory and the Courts: 1967-1983,72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1997) (arguing that judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s worked to push agencies
to expand representation and participation of stakeholder interests in shaping regulatory policies).
21.
See generally Jodi Short, The ParanoidStyle in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633

(2011).
22.

See Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 1, 108-10 (1994); see generally Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
23.
See Lawrence Lessig, The New ChicagoSchool, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661-91 (1998).
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experimenting with online measures for increasing transparency,
participation, and agency analysis.24
But these prior waves of reform have generally, with some exceptions,
tended to focus more on the goal of rationalizing and improving governance,
and less on addressing the background problems of disparate political power
and influence. To the extent that these measures of enhancing expertise,
insulation, transparency, and the like can address disparities of power, they
do so by prioritizing a more streamlined, and conflict-free vision of "good
governance."2 5 Yet even today there remains a broader concern across the
political spectrum about the risks of regulatory capture-the fear that
agencies might be particularly susceptible to the greater influence of industry
actors, whether in context of financial regulation, or in the failures of
enforcement leading up to the Gulf Oil Spill. 2 6 Recognizing the realities of
regulatory power can have large implications for a range of legal doctrines
in administrative law, from delegation to arbitrary and capricious review. 27
But it also suggests the potential need for a more far-reaching exploration of
legal and institutional reform to the process and structure of administrative
agencies themselves.
The ideas of checks and balances, contestation, and participation are by
no means new to the modern administrative process. As Jon Michaels has
argued, we already have a "self-regulating administrative ecosystem" that is
"capable of harmonizing presidential priorities, public concerns, legislative
interests, expert opinions, and legal obligations." 28 On Michaels' account,
the administrative process recreates the familiar ethos of checks and balances
and contestation from the classic Madisonian separation of powers, but in a
different form.29 This "administrative separation of powers" involves instead
the tensions and checks between three sets of administrative actors:
24.

See, e.g., BETH NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE: THE TECHNOLOGIES OF

EXPERTISE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 210-26 (2015).

25.
For a longer critique of the good governance framework and regulatory reform, see generally
RAHMAN, supra note 11, at chapters 5 & 7.

26.

See, e.g., Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Speech on the Senate Floor (June 17, 2010) (available

at
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-slams-corporate-influence-at-mmsproposes-legislation-to-defend-integrity-of-government). More recent scholarship on regulatory capture
attempts to be more rigorous in defining and diagnosing capture as deviations from a prior, legitimate
policymaking process. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can We

Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 177-80 (2011) (defining
capture as being present when a sector of an industry has "acquired persistent influence [in a regulatory
regime] disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when the regulatory system was
established."). See also PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How

To LIMIT IT, 1-22, (David Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2013). This of course begs the question of
what a 'legitimate' process looks like Part Il of this paper below offers one possible normative theory of
democracy and regulation.
27.
See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L. J. 1003 (2015).
28.
Michaels, Of ConstitutionalCustodiansand Regulatory Rivals, supra note 12, at 231.
29.
Id.
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politically-appointed leaders, the professional expert civil service, and civil
society actors and interest groups. 30 Given this reality, the real problems of
administrative authority are not generic or endemic to all administrative
action; rather, where the administrative state is most problematic is where
these internal checks and balances might be undermined or "disabled," 3 1 for
example in independent agencies, in context of privatization, or in settings
of overly-interfering political pressure on civil society and independent civil
servants.3 2
While I am largely in agreement with Michaels' account, this concern
about the barriers to a well-functioning system of administrative checks and
balances is very real-and I would argue, a more endemic weakness lies
precisely in the degree to which civil society is in fact able to engage with
the administrative process on inclusive and equitable terms. Michaels rightly
notes that participation and civil society role might be "uneven, halfhearted,
prohibitively expensive, or shortsighted," 33 and the types of participation that
take place may not in fact accord with deliberative or majoritarian ideals. 34
Indeed, many of the standard frameworks for civil society participation in
the administrative process are either not sufficiently powerful to fully
balance rival forms of power and influence, or they are themselves easily coopted by existing loci of political power-exacerbating rather than balancing
power disparities.
Consider for example, the two most common and foundational
mechanisms of administrative participation: transparency and notice-andcomment. While transparency measures-notably the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) regime-have become touchstones for norms of
transparency and accountability, their day-to-day operation of FOIA falls far
short of these aspirations. FOIA itself is "shot through with exemptions," and
use of the FOIA system tends to favor sophisticated industry and business
interests. Rather than facilitating inclusive decision-making, FOIA can often
be a harmful distraction and imposition on regulators themselves. And
perhaps most perniciously, FOIA facilitates an ethos of distrust and
skepticism towards government, rather than deepening norms that encourage
more productive forms of engagement.3 6 Similarly, several studies have
30.
31.
32.
33.
(2015).
34.

Id. at 236--41.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 279-90.
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving SeparationofPowers, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 551

35.

Andrias offers a similar take on this argument. See Andrias, Separationsof Wealth, supranote

Id. at 558.

1, at 475-76.
36.

For a recent critique of FOLA and its harmful implications, see David E. Pozen, Freedom of

Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 1097, 1101 (2017) ("Given
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highlighted how notice-and-comment is often dominated by more
established and sophisticated business interests.37 More recently, the advent
of "e-rulemaking" via online commenting platforms like Regulations.gov
has made possible the mass flooding of comment dockets from a much wider
range and quantity of commenters.3 8 While this is a potentially positive
development, there is still much work to be done both technologically and
normatively to enable regulators to manage these mass comment dockets.39
There is also some skepticism about the degree to which such mass
comments are in fact useful or influential on rulemaking. 40
Indeed, while the administrative state already possesses a variety of
mechanisms for participation, from notice-and-comment to negotiated
rulemaking to advisory committees and more, 4 1 the efficacy of these
mechanisms and the degree to which they serve to counterbalance power
disparities depends a great deal on presumptions about who makes use of
these vehicles, and how influential those uses actually are.
B. BATTLING UPHILL: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE

These key points-the reality of regulatory politics, and the useful but
limited ability of existing regulatory institutions to balance disparities of
power and influence-are highlighted by the rich historical literature
documenting how social movements and civil society actors have engaged
regulatory agencies. Political science scholarship on "bureaucratic politics"
highlights how regulators themselves are political actors, leveraging
relationships and coalitions among civil society actors to build their
legitimacy and autonomy-which in turn enables regulators to carve out the
FOIA's many limitations and drawbacks, a forward-looking legislative approach must do more than
refine the Act's request-driven strategy: it must look beyond the FOIA strategy altogether."); see also

Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 894-914 (2006) (describing the
positive and negative consequences of transparency under disclosure laws, including FOIA); Jameel
Jaffer & Brett M. Kaufman, A Resurgence of Secret Law, 126 YALE L.J. F. 242, 243-49 (2016)
(examining the decline of the FOlA "working law" doctrine developed by the Supreme Court); see
generallyAbraham D. Sofaer, JudicialControlofInformal DiscretionaryAdjudication and Enforcement,

72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972) (discussing the early role of the judiciary in FOIA determinations).
37.
See generally e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy,68 J. POL. 128 (2006).
38.
For a discussion of e-rulemaking, see NOVECK, supra note 24.
39.
For a discussion of new computational tools to assist in synthesizing mass comment dockets,
see Michael Livermore, Vladimir Eidelman, & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted Regulatory

Participation,93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
See Cynthia R. Farina et. al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 477 (2011) ("The
40.
true potential of Rulemaking 2.0 is unknowable at this point because e-rulemaking has not tried

systematically to address the barriers of stakeholder unawareness, process ignorance, and rulemaking
information overload.").

41.
See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participationin Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev.
1300, 1308-10 (2016) (summarizing existing vectors for participation).
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policy space needed to act as policy entrepreneurs and innovators.
Regulatory power, as a result, is less a consequence of commands from
above or legal procedural hurdles and protections, but rather the interface
between state actors on the one hand, and civil society actors on the other.42
Meanwhile a growing literature in legal history and "administrative
constitutionalism" highlights the ways in which social movements from civil
rights to economic justice to labor advocates have deliberately and
strategically engaged regulatory agencies as an often overlooked but critical
arena in which to contest existing power disparities and generate new norms
and policies in response.4 3 Historical excavations of social movement
interactions with local-level bureaucracies yield similar lessons in the local
administrative context. These accounts underscore that while regulatory
processes are already arenas of political contestation and disagreement, they
nevertheless still suffer from severe disparities in power and influence.
1.

Movements and Power in the FederalAdministrative State

Consider for example, Meg Jacobs' account of World War II-era price
administration. Even at the height of top-down wartime administrative
planning, movements engaged the regulatory state to shape policies and
contest visions of economic and political inclusion. As Jacobs details in her
study of the Office of Price Administration ("OPA") in the early 1940s, the
growing consumer rights movement used the fact of wartime administrative
price-setting over consumer goods as a catalyst for organizing. The OPA
stitched together a "cross-class coalition of consumers" around the goals of
price stability." For Jacobs, that window of dynamic interplay between a
broad-based consumer movement and the OPA not only shaped the OPA's
policies and internal norms; it also helped deepen the identity and aspirations
of the consumer movement itself.45 This is an example of what Jacobs calls
"state-building from the bottom-up." 46 But over time, this coalition was
disrupted and marginalized by more organized interest groups who gained
the upper hand in influencing wartime price-setting, ultimately leading to its
demise.

42.
See DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (Ira Katznelson et al. eds.,
2001); see generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2010).
43.
See Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1905-06 (2013)
(describing and reviewing this trend in the literature).
44.
Meg Jacobs, "How About Some Meat? ": The Office of Price Administration, Consumption

Politics, and State Buildingfrom the Bottom Up, 1941-1946, 84 J. AM. HIST. 910, 931 (1997).
45. See id. at 939-40.
46. Id. at 912; see id. at 939-40.
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Similarly, Karen Tani's study explains how Native American activists
battled to secure access to welfare benefits under the Social Security Act and
the Constitution by navigating state and federal bureaucracies in the 1930s
and 1940s.47 Here too, there is both an indication of the potential value of the
administrative process-by creating another policymaking arena, it afforded
a more hidden but potentially powerful space in which a marginalized
constituency could make novel claims, and seek redress that might otherwise
be denied-as well as a warning of the difficulties that such strategies might
pose; for once favorable allies within the agency leave or are disciplined, the
efficacy of these movement advocacy strategies plummets.
More recently, battles over "Net Neutrality" and the principles
governing the backbone infrastructure of the internet have been the product
of a pitched political battle between interest groups, activists, and regulators
at the FCC. Movement activists successfully pressured FCC commissioners
through social media campaigns and sit-ins, harnessing tactics more
commonly employed in electoral campaigns and legislative lobbying, while
other groups leveraged outside experts to monitor technical FCC proposals
and suggest alternatives. 48 In so doing, these vast yet often difficult-toorganize constituencies successfully checked the more powerful and wellconnected vested interests of internet service providers, and telecom giants
like Comcast and Verizon. Yet here too the story is a mixed one: as the
Obama administration gave way to the Trump administration, net neutrality
was placed on the chopping block under the new FCC leadership, repealed
by the FCC under President Trump's appointed Chairman, Ajit Pai.49 The
relative ease with which these policies were undone despite extensive
stakeholder and popular opposition indicates the need for greater channels
for voice and representation within the administrative process.
2.

Movements andPower in the Local Administrative State

The opportunities and challenges posed by the administrative process are
not limited to the federal arena. Local administration indicates the same
dynamics as both an arena where power can be exercised and contestedand a domain where existing power disparities tend to reassert themselves
with troubling ease. Consider for example, the experience of the War on
Poverty and the welfare rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Though
often dismissed as a failure, these efforts involved a number of attempts to
47.

See generally, Karen M. Tani, States' Rights, Welfare Rights, and the Indian Problem:

Negotiating Citizenshipand Sovereignty, 1933-1954, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2015).
48.
See generally Edward Walker et al., What Worked in the Fight for Net Neutrality, THE
GETTYSBURG PROJECT ON Civic ENGAGEMENT (August 2015), http://gettysburgproject.org/netneutrality.

49. Restoring InternetFreedom, FCC Docket 17-108 (December 14, 2017) https://transition.fcc
.gov/DailyReleases/Daily Business/2018/dbO 105/FCC-I 7-166A I.pdf (declaratory ruling).
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create some very real avenues for empowering African-Americans, the urban
poor, and minority groups."o
The 1964 Economic Opportunity Act ("EOA") developed new programs
to tackle poverty through job training, work-study, and access to legal
services. But the most radical innovation of the War on Poverty lay in its
experiments with policies and institutions that mobilized community groups
themselves as a political force to hold the bureaucracy itself accountable to
its poverty-reduction mandate. The EOA provided funding for community
organizing; created local boards consisting of local government officials and
representatives from business, local community groups, and minority and
low-income stakeholders; and involved community organizations in the
implementing poverty-reduction programs such as training centers and legal
services clinics. 1
For advocates of this "maximum feasible participation" approach, power
was a central animating concept.52 These policymakers saw poverty as a
problem of political disempowerment, not just of insufficient income.
Therefore, the only way to combat poverty was to empower poor people with
direct voice in the shaping, governing, and implementing of poverty
programs.54 Only through such direct empowerment could the poor hold the
bureaucracy accountable-and redress the traditional disparities of political
influence in local government. 5 This political strategy for reducing poverty
proved remarkably effective.5 ' By creating institutionalized sources of
political power and leverage, the community action approach inspired many
local community organizations to channel funds toward expanding
membership, providing services, and mobilizing constituencies as a political
force in defense of poverty-reducing policies." Even where local groups
were denied representation on community action boards by local elites, the
institutional commitment to representation created a potent foundation for
exerting political pressure on policymakers.

50.
For several recent analyses of the positive political effects of the War on Poverty and their
implications for today, see generally, e.g., NOEL A. CAZENAVE, IMPOSSIBLE DEMOCRACY: THE
UNLIKELY SUCCESS OF THE WAR ON POVERTY COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS (2007); see also Tara J.
Melish, Maximum FeasibleParticipationofthe Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st
Century War on the Sources ofPoverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2010).
51.
See generally CAZENAVE, supranote 50; see also Melish supra note 50.

52.

See generally Melish, supra note 50.

53.

See generally CAZENAVE, supra note 50; Melish supra, note 50.

54.
55.

Id
Id.

56.

See generally CAZENAVE, supranote 50.

57.

Id.

58.

See generally WAR ON POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY, 1940-1980 (Annelise

Orleck & Lisa Hazirjian eds., 2011).
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As some recent historical accounts suggest, the collapse of the War on
Poverty owes much to a backlash against this community empowermentin a sense, proving just how potent these new institutional structures could
be in shifting the balance of power at the local level. As community action
programs catalyzed the mobilization of grassroots constituencies to advocate
for more accountable and equitable economic policies, the backlash from
local power elites-from the political establishment to business interestsled to systematic efforts to defund and dismantle community action. 5 9
Ultimately, the problem was a lack of alignment over the importance of
community action itself. Federal officials saw participation as a more
surface-level strategy to generate cooperation and consensus among
stakeholders, whereas the civil rights and welfare rights movements saw it
as a mechanism for reclaiming greater political power over economic
policymaking. State and local governments, meanwhile, saw the directive for
formal representation of the poor as a categorical threat to their own authority
and control of patronage networks.6 0 Even the founders of the program in the
Johnson administration often operated under vastly different motivations and
visions for how significantly the program should invest in poor people's
political power, as opposed to merely providing welfare services.61 As a
result of these tensions, while more than 1,600 community action boards
were established by 1968, covering two-thirds of the nation's counties; by
1974 most of the funding for the most active programs had been withdrawn
due to new restraints from Congress and the dismantling of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, the federal office charged with creating and
coordinating community action across the country.6 2
The experience of the War on Poverty underscores similar lessons found
in administrative constitutionalism literature. First, local level administrative
processes and institutions, such as the allocation of economic development
funds and the administering of poverty programs, represented a valuable
political arena that grassroots constituencies could target, mobilize around,
and seek to leverage for substantive claims. In so doing, the processes of
local administration became a key battleground not just over substantive
policies, but over the background distribution of local political power.
Indeed, it was this threat to the existing power hierarchy that generated the
harsh counterreaction among local mayors and other powerful elites against
welfare rights activists. Second, the critical challenge for these models to
work, however, is to secure the buy-in and cooperation both from

59.
60.

Id.
Melish, supra note 50, at 28.

61.
See generally MICHAEL GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY
(Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2010).
Melish, supranote 50, at 26-27.
62.
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government officials and from community groups. As the War on Poverty's
failure indicates, where officials themselves reject the core premise of
participation, it is difficult to sustain these procedures. Where communities
are not organized and mobilized through advocacy and membership-based
organizations, there is no countervailing voice that can exert this kind of
pressure and credibly claim to speak on behalf of these communities when
policies are made.
These are just a few examples of the rich and growing historical
literature documenting these dynamic interactions between social
movements, administrative agencies, and the battles over public policy and
broader norms.63 For our purposes, the point is that empirically, agencies and
the administrative process are arenas in which important political battles
about policy and foundational norms take place. Social movements and
grassroots constituencies can engage in this arena, which affords new
opportunities for advocacy and claims-making. But while the administrative
process affords multiple points of entry for constituencies to engage, it does
not do enough to balance these terms of engagement. Thus, it is also the case
that conventional avenues into these spaces are by themselves not enough to
assure a level playing field. More sophisticated, well-resourced, and
established interest groups can too easily reassert their dominance, while the
ability of grassroots movements to exert influence is also too dependent on
the presence of favorably disposed officials within the bureaucracy itself.
This leaves the administrative arena in a difficult position: on the one hand,
its institutional flexibility and dynamism affords a surprising potential for
remedying broader disparities of political power; on the other hand, this
potential is only sporadically and occasionally realized.
III. THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF ADMINISTRATION: A

NORMATIVE CASE
From their inception, regulatory agencies have been seen as a remedy
for legislative failures. Late nineteenth century reformers developing new
regulatory agencies were in part concerned with the dangers of legislative
capture, corruption, or ineffectiveness. Furthermore, these early agencies
were understood as part of a broader effort to restore popular sovereignty
63.
See generally, e.g., JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (examining post-war
administrative reforms and the role of the judiciary in legitimizing administrative law in national
governance); see generally SOPHIA LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE

NEW RIGHT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (exploring the evolution of equal employment rights through
battles over the hiring and promotion practices in regulatory agencies like the Federal Communications
Commission and the Federal Power Commission); see generally Sophia Lee, Race, Sex, andRulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalismand the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010).
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over the more systemic and structural threats to the public good: the
upheavals of industrialization, new forms of economic power and inequality,
and experiences of economic dislocation that seemed to outstrip the
capacities of conventional policy tools and institutions.64 But what is
especially interesting about historical and contemporary accounts of
bureaucratic politics and administrative constitutionalism is their democratic
valence. Each of these accounts shine light on the efforts by constituencies
that are in different ways politically marginalized to enter the regulatory
arena and leverage the regulatory process in an attempt to offset this disparity
of political power. Regulatory agencies, as policymaking spaces with
discretion, become arenas where these constituencies attempt to achieve a
more equitable political voice. Indeed, the combination of administrative
discretion and the administrative process suggests that in addition to its
contributions of expertise and policy innovation, we might think of the
regulatory state as mitigating democratic defects as well.
As more of our day-to-day governance takes place through
administrative agencies and processes, the battles over administrative
authority have become more fraught." This anxiety is what lies behind calls
to reassert classic separation-of-powers restraints on administrative
agencies.66 But these appeals to administrative restraint are themselves
problematic; much of the authority and discretion afforded to agencies is
ineradicable-and arguably desirable. 67 In contrast 'to its image as a clinical
and mechanistic enterprise, the regulatory process is an essentially political
one, an arena in which different constituencies attempt to build and exercise
political power, shape public policy, and contest the meaning of moral and
policy norms. Adrian Vermeule has argued extensively that we must
embrace the reality that regulation is necessarily comprised of "gray zones"
of agency discretion beyond direct oversight or accountability. 6 Complete
control over agencies is too costly to achieve given the vast expanse of the
regulatory state; nor is such tight control desirable.

&

64.
See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 11; see generally William J. Novak, Stephen W. Sawyer,
James T. Sparrow, Democratic States of Unexception: Toward a New Genealogy of the American
Political, in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE: THEORIZING POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 229 (2017); William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control ofAmerican Capitalism,60 EMORY

L.J. 377 (2010).
65.
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 1, at 47 ("The more power the state possesses, the more it
matters who controls that power."); id. at 50-54 (describing the rise of battles over executive power,
presidential authority, and the administrative state as rooted in similar concerns).
See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 15.
66.
67.
See generally Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (2015); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION: FROM
LAW'S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016).
68.
See generally VERMEULE, supra note 67; Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009).
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This reality of administrative power raises two major implications. First,
administrative processes are already political domains, affected and
influenced by the same kinds of normative judgments and power disparities
that characterize ordinary electoral or legislative politics. This reality of
power and influence is one of the key lessons of the ongoing concerns over
regulatory capture, and the obvious and more subtle ways in which more
powerful organized interests, particularly business interests, are able to shape
regulations. 6 9 Second, the plasticity and front-line nature of administrative
institutions and processes provide a surprising potential for reshaping these
processes in ways that can take better account of such power disparities.
Indeed, the persistence of administrative discretion is not a tragic defect of
modernity to be minimized or eliminated; rather it is an attractive feature of
modern governance to be optimized and embraced. It is this administrative
flexibility and discretion that enables agencies to address the complexities of
public policy in a rapidly changing society.70
If this is the case, then it seems that administrative bodies and processes
can help address two of the central normative challenges in democratic
politics: first, creating spaces in which constituencies can engage in the
collective enterprise of making political and policy judgments, and second,
in addressing persistent problems of disagreement and power. Indeed,
democratic theorists addressing these questions evoke principles and
arguments that can be extended to the administrative arena-not just the
legislative or electoral arenas that are the more conventional focal points for
democratic political theory."1
A. DEMOCRATIC JUDGMENT IN ADMINISTRATION: WALDRON REVISITED
The idea that administrative processes may be desirable as a democratic
space may seem counter-intuitive at first, but consider the ways in which
today's administrative institutions share several features of quintessentially
democratic policymaking. To see this democratic potential of regulation,
consider a brief comparison to normative defenses of the central institution
of democratic popular sovereignty: the legislature. In Jeremy Waldron's
classic defense, legislation is fundamentally democratic for three reasons:
first, legislation provides an institutional forum in which collective reasoning
can occur-and where disagreement can be engaged openly.72 Second,
69.

For a good overview of the latest scholarship diagnosing and analyzing regulatory capture,

see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supranote 26, at 6-7, 9-11, 15-16.
70.
For a defense of agency discretion and flexibility, see Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, supra note 68.
71.
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 70 (1999).
72.
See WALDRON, supra note 71; see also Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity ofLegislation, 54 MD.

L. REv. 633, 654-60 (1995).
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because legislation arises from elected representatives, the outcomes of
legislation are understood to be fundamentally ours-the product of a
collective process in which we all have joint authorship-not the result of an
alien or arbitrary force. 73 Third, decision-makers are bound by the rules they
enact, forcing them to grapple with the costs, burdens, and opportunities
arising from policy judgments they might make, while internalizing the
tradeoffs and moral risks of their decisions. 74 For Waldron, the messiness
and complexity of ordinary legislation is both what seems to drive many
theorists to seek more neutral, apolitical forms of judgment-as in the
valorization of courts-yet it is that same messiness that makes legislation
fundamentally democratic and valuable.75
Waldron's concern with preserving the space for democratic politics and
agency has at times manifested in a critical stance towards the regulatory
state. 6 Yet the same defense of legislation, against the idealized image of
judicial or apolitical judgment, can also be applied to the administrative state.
This intuition may be surprising, because on the surface, regulation seems
more analogous to the judicial model than the legislative one, both in its
mainstream image and daily operations. The conventional image of
regulation draws much of its legitimacy from the idyll of rational
technocrats, who like judges, are insulated from the vagaries of conventional
politics, making judgments on the basis of their expertise and reason, bound
by norms of neutrality and objectivity.7 But regulatory bodies share many
of Waldron's democratic features.
First, regulation can serve as a policymaking forum for collective
decision-making. Most statutes and legislative arrangements are broad,
leaving weighty moral and political judgment in the hands of agencies.
73.

See WALDRON, supra note 71 at 87.

74.
75.

See id. at 80.
See id. at 24 (describing the common attraction to the judicialized model of decision-making-

seen as neutral, apolitical, rational, and deliberative-as rooted in a distrust of ordinary politics as messy,
fickle, prone to capture, and the product of tumultuous multitudes of representatives and interest groups,
and subject to all the contingencies, arbitrariness, and instabilities of fallible human judgment: "the danger
of focusing on legislation is that, as a source of law, it is all too human, all too associated with explicit,
datable decisions by identifiable men and women that we are to be subject to these rules rather than
those."); id. at 35 ("We should look [instead] ... at what conflict and tumult and numbers can accomplish
for liberty, and not be too easily disconcerted by the noisy or smelly or unsavory atmosphere of the
popular assembly.").

76.

See for example Waldron's defense of the separation-of-powers as a normative democratic

value. See generally Jeremy Waldron, SeparationofPowers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV.

433 (2013). Defenders of regulatory authority like Adrian Vermeule have seen this as a problematic
attempt to undo much of modem administrative law out of a concern of the blending of judicial,
legislative, and executive function in regulation. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of

Power, 109 Nw. L. REV. 673 (2015); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, The New Coke, supra note 67.
77.
For an example of such expertise-oriented regulatory reform, the Dodd-Frank financial
regulation overhaul is a prime example, particularly in its approach to addressing the problem of too-big-

to-fail (TBTF) financial firms. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C.S. § 5301 (2010); see also R.AHMAN, supra note 11, at Ch. 2.
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Administrative agencies are one of the primary ways in which our political
system addresses some of the most fundamental, yet difficult policy
questions. From environmental to workplace safety, to financial regulation,
to consumer protection, the modem regulatory state is our primary tool for
addressing systemic social and economic concerns. Furthermore, agenciesmore so than legislatures-are positioned at the front-line of governance,
where these policy problems are ultimately resolved, implemented, and
enforced. It is at the regulatory level that policymakers are forced to
confront directly the nuts-and-bolts and fundamental societal tradeoffs that
policies might trigger. Agencies thus provide a "central linchpin" in linking
democratic consent with concrete problem-solving.79 And in an era of
legislative gridlock, we have seen agencies increasingly repurposing old
statutory authorities to develop new policies.s Agencies thus possess broad
authority, and play a central role in policymaking.
Second, agencies and the administrative process offer, perhaps counterintuitively, some major advantages over the electoral and legislative
processes in representation, inclusion, and voice. In particular, agencies have
the ability to house a more dynamic forum of representation that is not
bounded by the geographic boundaries of legislative districts.si Electoral
politics remains structured around geographically-bound jurisdictions, yet
many of the most important interests and concerns in modern governance cut
across these districts, whether in the form of race, ethnicity, class, gender,
environmental concern, or other interests.82 For these groups, nonelectoral
forms of representation are crucial to securing an adequate voice in the
political arena. The regulatory process offers a more hospitable arena for
issue and constituency-based advocacy and voice.83 The administrative
process, then, is more than just a remedial attempt at defusing anxieties about
administrative power that exists outside the classic separation-of-powers
framework. Rather, it offers the potential of creating genuinely new and
CHRISTOPHER K ANSELL, PRAGMATIST DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING AS PUBLIC
78.
PHILOSOPHY 3 (2011) (describing how public agencies are the "nexus of democracy and governance,"

where popular consent and legitimation in broad terms clashes with the need to respond to immediate
complex policy problems).
79. See id. at 5.
80.
See id. at 3.
81.

Mark E. Warren, Governance-DrivenDemocratization, 3 CRITICAL POL'Y STUD. 3, 6 (2009)

(Agencies possess a unique "capacity to bring into existence dynamic, serial, and overlapping peoples
and constituencies," engaging all affected citizens "in contrast to pre-defined and relatively static
territorial constituencies.").
82.
See generally Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in
ContemporaryDemocratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387 (2008).

83.

Id. at 388-90; see id. at 396-97 ("Nongeographical constituencies-those emerging from

race, ethnicity, class, gender, environment, global trade, and so on-are represented only insofar as they
intersect with the circumstances of location, producing only an accidental relationship" between the
institutional structure of electoral representation and the ideal of democratic self-governance).

338

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

[Vol. 27:315

more balanced forms of democratic participation and engagement in the dayto-day task of governing.
Third, the good judgment that Waldron celebrates in legislatures is a
product of the fact that decision-makers must themselves face the
repercussions of their decisions, thus forcing a degree of internalizing costs
and tradeoffs, which in turn promotes good judgment. But this is what
agencies, more so than legislatures, are particularly adept at doing through
their processes of consultation and impact analysis.
Where the analogy holds weakest is in Waldron's normative
commitment that decision-making processes be inclusive of affected
interests and be understood as expressions of the collective will. The
administrative process has developed mechanisms to engage and include
diverse stakeholders in the policymaking process. But as we will see,
administrative institutions can be reworked to better facilitate such
engagement and inclusion, particularly in light of disparities of power,
resources, organization, and sophistication among different stakeholders.
Nevertheless, agencies are structurally well-positioned as sites of political
judgment and day-to-day governance. If we can expand their ability to
manage an inclusive political process, the underlying democratic potential
of the administrative process can be more fully articulated.
B. POWER AND DISAGREEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: MADISON
REVISITED

Putting power at the center of our analysis changes significantly how we
think about the realities of democratic politics-and what the implications
might be for democratic institutional design. In particular, it calls into
question one common approach to viewing democratic institutions: what we
might call a "good governance" framework. These policies-such as efforts
to prevent lobbying, undo the "revolving door," increase the barriers between
interest groups and policymakers to make the latter more autonomous and
independent, or bind policymakers more directly to rational and apolitical
standards of decision-making through data and expertise requirements and
transparency measures-ultimately seek to rationalize, sterilize, or insulate

the policymaking processes from the undue influence of special interests. 84
But this view of democratic defect and remedy is problematic. Citizens
and political associations are not disinterested, rationalistic, deliberative
actors; they are, rather, necessarily subjective, partial, political. It is this
partiality that motivates political action, and which is irreducibly at the heart

84.
For an extended critique of the "good governance" view of democracy, see e.g., HOLLIE
RUSSON GILMAN AND K. SABEEL RAHMAN, OF, FOR, AND BY THE PEOPLE: CIVIC POWER IN AN ERA OF

INEQUALITY (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming), and RAHMAN, supra note 11 at 109-11.
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of most normative disagreements in politics." Furthermore, attempts at
sterilizing the policymaking process, however well-intended, have to be
viewed with some degree of skepticism, for it seems unlikely that insulation
can redress the fundamental problem of disparate political power. More wellresourced and sophisticated individuals and groups are likely to overcome
higher barriers to political entry; the groups most politically disempowered
are more likely to be "screened out."86
The reality is that disagreement and power politics are here to stay, nor
are they equally distributed across groups and geographies. That being the
case, the challenge for democratic institutional design is not to attempt to
sterilize policymaking of these pressures, but rather to engage, manage, and
balance them in ultimately productive ways. As James Madison famously
observed, a central goal of democratic institutional design was to counteract
the dangers of "faction" and of "cabals of the few" by harnessing the
countervailing power of rival factions and groups to prevent concentrations
of political power." That is, "ambition must be made to counteract
ambition."" This is the core Madisonian insight: given realities of power and
disagreement, institutional design must seek to that channel such
disagreement productively, creating institutions that facilitate the mutual
checking of power and influence. 89
Whether Madison himself was a true populist, or instead someone bent
on preserving aristocratic rule 90 is somewhat tangential for this broader point.
The key for our purposes is this shift to a specifically power-balancingview
of institutional design and democratic politics. 91 The goal, then, is not
85.
See generally, e.g., NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF
PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (2010); MIKA LAVAQUE-MANTY, ARGUMENTS WITH FISTS: POLITICAL
AGENCY AND JUSTIFICATION IN LIBERAL THEORY (2002); Hannah Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private
and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 346 (1981) ("What we need here [to generate political action] is not
separation but linkage. It is the connection that matters, the transformation of social conditions into
political issues, of need and interest into principle and justice.").
86.
See, e.g., SITARAMAN, supra note 1, at 44-47, citing to Kevin M. Stack, The Paradox of
Process in Administrative Rulemaking (forthcoming 2018).
87.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

88.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); accordLevinson, supra note 1, at 33, 36.

Levinson uses this Madisonian approach to frame the purposes of constitutional design as
89.
balancing power. See Levinson, supranote 1. See also Jane Mansbridge et al., The Place ofSelf-Interest

and the Role ofPower in DeliberativeDemocracy, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 64, 93 (2010) ("If, as we believe, the
exercise of power is inevitable in human politics, then we must, like Madison, design democratic
institutions that incorporate that power rather than ignore it.").
90.
See J. S. MALOY, THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 1-23 (2008)

(discussing the participatory strains of founding-era republicanism).
91. The emphasis on countervailing power and contestation and its contrast to good governance
understandings of democracy represents a running fault line in democratic theory, between accounts that
prioritize consensus, deliberation, and collaboration on the one hand, and accounts that emphasize
conflict, disagreement, and contest on the other. See generally e.g., JOHN P. MCCORMICK,
MACHIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY, 141-69 (2011) (contrasting his contestatory approach to the more

aristocratic, deliberative view of other modem republican theorists like Philip Pettit); IAN SHAPIRO, THE
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necessarily to prioritize institutional designs for their epistemic, deliberative,
or technocratic values (though we may of course still hope to promote such
values). Rather, this Madisonian view suggests that institutions must also
focus on facilitating countervailing power and checks and balances. While
we often associate Madisonian institutional design with the constitutional
separation of powers, this focus on power-building could take a variety of
other forms.92 Some scholars have highlighted the role of class-based
institutions in empowering the powerless public against powerful economic
elites as a major tradition in republican thought, from the Roman tribunes of
the plebs to more modem consociationalist models.93 Election law scholars
have similarly appealed to Madisonian values of contestation and conflict to
call for more competitive electoral systems that undo "lockups" of the
electoral process from overbearing parties, political entrenchment, or even
campaign finance overreach.9 4
Descriptively, administrative agencies and processes already serve as
key forums for democratic politics, advocacy, and social movement
engagement with policymakers. Normatively, these institutions and
processes could be adapted to more self-consciously promote these
democratic features of administration-in particular, facilitating collective
democratic judgment and balancing power disparities across different
constituencies. But for regulatory agencies to be more effective at this
democratic aspiration, we need a somewhat different approach to the design
and implementation of regulatory policy. In the next Part, we will see some
examples of how local and federal administration can be harnessed to
deliberately mitigate power disparities and facilitate the engagement of
movements and grassroots constituencies. This in turn will help us develop
some more generalizable lessons and tools to be discussed in Part V.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER-BUILDING: TWO BRIEF
EXAMPLES
Administrative agencies and processes can be useful spaces in which to
reshape the power dynamics between different interest groups,
STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2003). For an application of a similar Madisonian view of contestation
to issues of legislative reform, see Lee Drutman, Political Dynamism: A New Approach to Making
Government Work Again NEW AMERICA (February 2016) https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/1 24

04-political-dynamism-2/politicaldynamism.c416ce23ca23482b8da8f~feafl4
dbb3.pdf. See also Levinson, supra note 1, at 33 ("Constitutionalism is the project of creating, allocating,
and constraining state power.").
See Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supranote 1, at 423.
92.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 91; Sitaraman, supra note I (exploring what a similar strategy
93.
for balancing class-based political power might look like in more formal 'mixed-constitutional' methods).
See Elizabeth Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
94.

Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1505-06 (2000).
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constituencies, and institutional levers. This Part highlights two concrete,
paired examples: first comparing two new federal agencies developed in
response to the financial crisis; and second, comparing two local government
boards that seek to empower stakeholders through different mechanisms.
These paired contrasts suggest how administrative institutions and policies
can be deliberately designed to mitigate power disparities. In turn, these
cases will inform the beginnings of a more general framework discussed in
Part V below.
A. POWER, POLICY, AND REGULATION: POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS REFORMS

Despite the vast implications financial regulation has on the economy
and society as a whole, financial regulatory agencies have traditionally been
relatively insulated from broad-based participation by constituencies outside
of financial industry interests. The relative insularity of financial regulatory
agencies has made it challenging to elevate the views and concerns of
marginalized, vulnerable, or diffused constituencies above the demands of
firms with business interests at stake.95 While much of the financial
regulation debate has tended to focus on policy questions of systemic risk,
financial stability, and consumer protection, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act also offers an instructive example of
how institutional design questions can also have implications for the broader
balance of power between different constituencies. Consider in particular the
contrast between the two new agencies created by Dodd-Frank: the Financial
Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB").96
From a policy perspective, the central problem the FSOC was designed
to solve was the fragmentation of the financial regulatory landscape. Prior to
the 2008 financial crisis, part of the challenge was that no single regulator
was charged with the responsibility for systemic financial stability concerns.
As a result, the risks of mortgage-backed securities and toxic assets fell
through the cracks in the gaps between the jurisdictions of securities,

95.
Gillian Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving
Relationship Between Administrative Law and FinancialRegulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129,
130-31 (2015) ("Although financial regulation agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, their
regulatory mode is often more informal, ad hoc, and hidden from public view. Protecting vulnerable
groups and preventing externalities are important concerns, but an overriding regulatory goal is ensuring
the stability of the financial system, which often means protecting profitable lines of business."); see also
Saule Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians. Toward Tripartism in Financial Services
Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 623 (2012) (noting the chronic lack of public representation and
participation in financial regulation-especially macro questions of systemic risk).
96. For a preliminary take on this comparison see my earlier work, RAHMAN, supra note 11, at
156-60.
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commodities, and bank regulators.97 But this fragmentation represents more
than just a policy problem; it was also an accountability problem. In a highly
fragmented regulatory ecosystem, established players like financial firms
who can navigate accordingly, exploit gaps for regulatory arbitrage, and
exercise outsized influence on individual regulatory agencies.98
In the debate over regulatory fragmentation, the idea of consolidating all
our financial regulatory institutions into a "single-peak" regulator similar to
the UK's Financial Services Authority was quickly dismissed.99
Nevertheless, the FSOC as created represents a major attempt at
consolidating systemic risk regulation authority in a single body, and
coordinating between the different financial regulatory agencies like the
SEC, the CFTC, and more.' 00 Creating a centralized systemic risk regulator
transformed the dynamics of power and influence in financial regulation,
enabling not only policy coordination, but also protecting against undue
industry influence. The FSOC is insulated from interest group pressure, with
increased political accountability upwards to the President through the
Treasury Secretary's role as chair of the FSOC.io' But what is telling about
the FSOC is that even as it attempted to rationalize and coordinate regulation,
closing off gaps for financial firms to arbitrage, it did little to expand the
direct representation and voice of affected but often less influential
constituencies. As Saule Omarova has noted, to make macro financial policy
more accountable and responsive would require institutionalizing greater
representation of more diverse constituencies from workers to consumers to
student debtors and others.1 0 2 Omarova's counter-proposal is the creation of
a "Public Interest Council" with representatives of these diverse
constituencies, charged with overseeing and holding accountable financial
regulators themselves.' 03
Like the FSOC, the CFPB was partly created to respond to the problem
of capture and fragmentation of banking and financial regulators.' But in
97.

See e.g., Michael Barr, The FinancialCrisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91,

at 94-95 (2012).
98.
On the facility of interest groups in exercising influence on regulators in fragmented and
complex regulatory environments, see generally e.g., Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the
Regulation ofModern FinancialMarkets, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 235 (2012) and John Coffee, Political
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk
Perpetuated,97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
See Michael S. Barr, Comment: Accountability and Independence in Financial Regulation:
99.
Checks and Balances, Public Engagement, and Other Innovations, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 122-

25 (2015).
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Metzger, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 95, at 146-47.
Omarova, supra note 95.

103.

See id. at 659-69 (describing the details of Omarova's proposed Public Interest Council).

104. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013).
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contrast to the FSOC, the CFPB was designed not just to be insulated from
political pressure, but rather to be more accountable; first, through a
substantive mission of consumer protection, and second, through a greater
commitment to engagement with grassroots constituencies and affected
communities.10 s As a result, the success of the CFPB is arguably a product
of the agency's de facto role as a "proxy representative" of consumer
interests in the financial regulatory ecosystem.1 06
First, the CFPB possesses a newly consolidated and empowered
decision-making authority. This makes it more visible to lay citizens as a
target for airing grievances and seeking redress. It also makes it more
responsive and accountable by centralizing consumer protection and
watchdog functions. A consolidated CFPB offers one way of re-slicing the
same policy space that had previously been fragmented, confusing to lay
constituencies and easily navigated by financial sector firms. Instead, the
CFPB centralizes authority in one agency, thus clarifying lines of
accountability and responsibility, and providing a clear target against whom
stakeholder groups can make claims.
At the same time, the CFPB has a culture that enables it to act not only
as a neutral policymaker, but as a representativeof consumer interests. The
CFPB contains designated offices for outreach to and engagement with
constituencies that may have particular needs, but are often overlooked in
financial regulation policy, such as veterans, students, and pensioners. 107 The
agency's orientation is also a product of its personnel: many individuals
working in the CFPB are themselves veterans of the consumer rights
movement.

08

Through public hearings and town halls set up around the country, 109
CFPB staff leverage public engagement to identify priorities for new rules
and enforcement actions. The agency has also experimented with online
platforms to engage broader participation, from its launching of a new
centralized consumer complaint database, to its innovative use of online
platforms like Regulation Room to engage more diverse groups in
commenting on ongoing rulemakings." 0 The CFPB also runs a complaint
105. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 95, at 148, 152; Barr, Comment:
Accountability and Independence in FinancialRegulation, supra note 99, at 127.
106. See Danial Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs:
Some Evidence from InsuranceRegulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013).

107. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493).
108. Telephone interview with Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Community Affairs office,
(May 28, 2015).
109. See, e.g., FieldHearing on Debt Collection in Sacramento, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/field-hearing-debt-collection-

sacramento-calif (last updated July 28, 2016).
110.

See, e.g., Farina et al., supranote 40.
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database,' compiling millions of grievances and concerns from the general
public, in a publicly-searchable and accessible system. 112 The database
enables the CFPB to set priorities based on its analysis of the real problems
facing ordinary Americans.' 13 The public nature of the database also helps
shame and hold accountable industry actors, while holding the CFPB itself
to account.
The agency also operates an office of community affairs office charged
with organizing outreach to consumer advocacy groups and seeking input
from constituencies like minorities, students with debt, and homeowners. 14
Community Affairs invests significant staff time and resources into
identifying grassroots stakeholders, lay citizens, and community
organizations who can speak for different segments of the population,
actively working to build the trust and relationships needed to engage and
empower these grassroots voices in shaping the agency's direction by
identifying problems, and weighing in on open policy questions."' By
running town halls, focus groups, online engagements, and other strategies,
Community Affairs has as its core mission the building of trust and
relationships with affected constituencies, in hopes of channeling these
grassroots concerns into the core work of the agency itself.1 16
Viewing the FSOC and CFPB in comparison is instructive. Both FSOC
and CFPB radically reshaped the relationships between industry and
regulators by creating a new consolidated, centralized regulatory
authority.' This consolidation of authority changes existing power
dynamics, disrupting existing relationships between industry and agencies,
and closing off gaps firms can exploit. But it is the CFPB that has generated
the most vitriolic pushback from financial interests, in large part because of
the realization that it can serve as a powerful advocate on behalf of
constituencies ordinarily overrun in financial reform decisions. The fact that
the CFPB combined both a consolidation of authority and power on the one
111. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consu
merfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).

112.

Id

113. See Barbara Kiviat, The CFPB Is Making Government More Accountable. The GOP Wants to
Stop It, WASH. MONTHLY (June 8, 2017), http://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/06/08/the-cfpb-ismaking-govemment-more-accountable-the-gop-wants-to-stop-it/.
114. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-

us/the-bureau/ (last visited Jan 31, 2018).
115.

Telephone interview with Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 108.

116.

Id.

117. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 95, at 148; see also Leonard J. Kennedy,
Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation

for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1158-59, 1164-65 (2012) (arguing that the
CFPB is fulfilling its statutory obligations through four principles: "(1) a market-based approach, (2) a
focus on evidence-based analysis, (3) a commitment to encouraging and enabling robust public

participation through transparency and innovative uses of technology, and (4) a recognition that history
and other agencies' experience can provide invaluable guidance.").
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hand with a greater connection to grassroots constituencies on the other made
it a more radical threat to existing distributions of power and influence in the
financial regulation space. The FSOC by contrast, while powerful in its own
right, has been approached by financial sector interests like any other
regulator-indeed, from the Volcker Rule to other major FSOC initiatives,
financial sector interests have proven adept at lobbying and influencing even
the FSOC's new systemic risk regulations."'
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE BATTLE FOR URBAN EQUITY
We can see similar challenges in balancing power in the context of locallevel regulation. As several scholars working in the revived interest in local
government law and urban inequality suggest, questions about participation
and power have long shaped local battles over economic development,
zoning, and housing policy.' 19 The porousness and relative informality of
local level administrative governance offer wider opportunities for civil
society participation, organizing, and influence.120 In one sense, decisions
over local land use and housing policy enjoy multiple, institutionalized forms
of representation and participation meant to balance power disparities and
assure an inclusive policymaking process, from community boards to zoning
procedures and more. But these institutional efforts to balance power are
only effective when they occur in institutions that exercise significant
authority and influence themselves. Battles over urban inequality and
economic development thus highlight the importance of both institutional
consolidation and authority on the one hand, and expanded civil society
leverage on the other.
Consider for example, the ongoing interest in balancing constituency
power and interests against more well-resourced and powerful groups like
developers and financiers in context of urban development projects.
Beginning in the 1990s, civil society groups began experimenting with
118. See generally,Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F.Supp.3d 219 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (reversing FSOC's determination that Metlife constituted a significant financial institution); Hilary
J. Allen, Putting the "FinancialStability" in FinancialStability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
1087, (2015) (arguing that the influence of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department handicaps
FSOC's ability to perform its duties); Cary Martin Shelby, Closing the Hedge FundLoophole: The SEC
as the Primary Regulator of Systemic Risk, 58 B.C. L. REV. 639, (2017) (describing FSOC's failure to
classify hedge funds as Systematically Important Financial Institutions and arguing that the SEC should
be the primary agency tasked with financial stability); Christina P. Skinner, RegulatingNonbanks: A Plan
for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379 (2017).
119.

See generally, e.g. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL

AGE (2016); Davidson, supra note 7; Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014). For
classic accounts of democracy, power, and inequality in the city, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (2001); GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID BARRON, CITY
BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2013).

120. See Davidson, supra note 7.
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'

"community benefits agreements" ("CBAs") as a way to hold developers
more accountable for investing in local communities rather than simply
exploiting these neighborhoods for elite-serving and gentrifying projects.12
Generally, CBAs refer to contractual agreements between private developers
and grassroots community groups (though increasingly local governments
have also become direct parties to more modem agreements), committing
developers to invest some degree of resources into local needs-such as
parks and infrastructure-while also committing to certain labor
requirements, including hiring from local communities and complying with
higher wage and worker safety and security standards.122 CBAs have been
praised as a way to hold developers accountable for more inclusive and
equitable development.' 2 3 But they also have their critics. In some cases,
CBAs have been vehicles for more narrow constituencies to extract
concessions that may or may not serve the larger neighborhood. 2 4 Even if
CBAs are successful, there remain challenges for their impact, as they are
limited to the particular development or project, and often lack a larger
connection to regional or city-wide zoning, housing, and land use
decisions.1 25
A key challenge for CBAs has been not only in assuring
representativeness of the community groups negotiating with developers;
there has also been an ongoing challenge of assuring that developers actually
follow through on these commitments.1 2 6 Community benefits are often
agreed to but ignored, as developers capture or simply run roughshod over
local government bodies. As one study suggests, successful CBAs are often
marked by the presence of well-organized, effective community organizing
groups capable of holding developers accountable to the terms of the
agreement. 2 7 But in recent years, newer experiments with CBAs suggest a
further set of requirements: not only well-organized community groups, but
specifically well-organized community groups that are connected to
institutional levers of influence and power.1 2 8
The recent debate over the Oakland Army Base redevelopment is
illustrative of this power-oriented approach. The Army Base is home to a
massive $152 million venture transforming the old army base into a global
121. See generally e.g. Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practiceof Economic
Justice: Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic ofthe New Accountable Development Movement, 17
J. COMMUNITY PRAC. 88 (2009); Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Actually Benefit

Communities?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2016).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See De Barbieri supranote 121, at 1788-91.
125.

For a recent overview and analysis of CBAs, see generally De Barbieri, supranote 121.

126.

Id.; See Parks & Warren, supra note 121.

127.

See generally, Parks & Warren, supra note 121.

128.

Id
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logistics and shipping center. 129 In 2013, the developers entered into a
community benefit agreement and a project labor agreement with the City of
Oakland and a coalition of community organizations, spearheaded by Revive
Oakland, itself an umbrella group bringing together faith groups, labor
organizations, racial and economic justice organizations, and community
members. 130 The Oakland CBA involves two notable elements.
First, in order to implement the local hire requirements, the city formally
created the West Oakland Job Resource Center.13 1 The CBA requires the
developers to work with the Job Center when hiring for the project.13 2
Furthermore, the city engaged the East Bay Alliance for Sustainable
Economies ("EBASE"), one of the leading grassroots organizations in the
area and a key player in the Revive Oakland coalition, to get the Job Center
up and running.13 3 The Job Center meanwhile pro-actively recruits qualified
candidates, while providing support and referrals for job seekers helping
them leverage their engagement with the Army Base project into longer-term
jobs and careers.134 As a workforce development and jobs plan, this has
proven successful, particularly in transitioning local hires into longer-term
trades and careers.135 For our purposes, it is the creation of the Job Center
itself, and the role of EBASE in taking on responsibility but also a share of
power over the hiring of the project, that is notable.
This role of community groups is even more apparent in the enforcement
regime set up by Oakland for the project. The development and CBA are
both monitored by a newly-created, city-chartered oversight body comprised
of representatives from the developers and community organizations. 13 6 The
Commission is comprised of eleven members appointed by the Mayor, 137
removable for cause.13 8 Five of the members are required to be appointed
129.

See Annie Sciacca, Port gives initial OK to revamp former army base in West Oakland,

MERCURY NEWS, November 10, 2017 https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/11/10/port-gives-initial-okto-revamp-former-army-base-in-west-oakland/.
130. See EBASE and Revive Oakland Win Big, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES (June 29,

2012), http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/article/ebase-and-revive-oakland-win-big. See also K. Sabeel
Rahman, The Key to Making Economic Development More Equitable Is Making It More Democratic,
NATION (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-key-to-making-economic-developmentmore-equitable-is-making-it-more-democratic/.

131. Telephone interview with East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy (Apr. 22, 2015)
[hereinafter EBASE]. See also EBASE and Revive Oakland Win Big, supra note 130; Rahman, The Key
to Making Economic Development More Equitable, supra note 130.

132.
133.
134.

EBASE, supra note 131.
Id.
Id.

135.

See Fran Smith, Opinion, Oakland Army Base Is a Model for Equitable Development, NEXT

CITY (Feb.

19, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/oakland-army-base-jobs-community-benefits-

development.

136.
137.
138.

See Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13140 (Nov. 13, 2012).
Id.at§3.
Id. at § 6.
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from various community organizations and coalition groups specified in the
ordinance, with an additional two members from organized labor.' 39 The
remainder of seats are split between two members from the city and two from
the developer.1 40 This distribution of seats is telling: not only are local
stakeholders included, but they hold the balance of power on the
Commission. The city and developers combined constitute only four of 11
seats; the Revive Oakland coalition and its partners and labor together hold
seven seats. 14 1 The powers of the Commission are also significant. The
Commission is charged with reviewing the implementation of the CBA,
monitoring compliance with the agreement, and negotiating directly with the
developers for remedies of possible violations.1 42 The city itself is committed
to enforce the agreement as a backstop if such negotiations fall short.143 The
Commission is also charged with issuing reports and findings, and
empowered to develop additional procedures for its monitoring functions.
The Commission provides a foothold of oversight power for all affected
stakeholders. It also provides a forum for airing grievances empowering
community organizations and civil society groups to bring claims where the
developers might be falling short of commitments on local hire or
community benefits investments. 145 As a result, the Commission both serves
as a unique focal point for civic engagement, and a vital point of leverage for
community members to influence the project on an ongoing basis. According
to Revive Oakland members, the project is not only meeting its local hire
benchmarks, but exceeding them.' 46 More importantly, this substantive
outcome has been achieved through a structure that has created greater power
and influence for the communities themselves. The national Partnership for
Working Families is already developing newer iterations of this model for
CBAs around the country.' 47
The idea of incorporating constituent representation on local
commissions is by no means new, but these commissions can often fail to
create the kind of power-shifting that has marked the Oakland CBA and
Commission. To illustrate this divergence, consider by contrast the attempt
to institutionalize representation in rent-stabilization policy in New York
City.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at § 3.
Id
Id §§ 1, 2a-2c.
Id § 2d.
Id. §5.

145.

RAHMAN, supra note 11.

146.

See EBASE, supra note 131.

147. See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Toolkit, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES,
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreements-and-policies
(last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
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Housing and land use policy in New York have long been dominated by
wealthier, well-connected, and politically-influential real estate interests,
with deep connections in both New York and in the state government in
Albany. There are, however, multiple institutionalized requirements that
seek to balance this power disparity by codifying some degree of
consultation and influence for resident and tenant interests. For example,
approximately two million units of housing are rent-stabilized, where annual
rental increases are set by the Rent Guidelines Board ("RGB"), an
administrative board comprised of representatives from landlord groups,
tenant advocacy groups, and "public" members-all appointed by the
Mayor.148 This not only gives tenants a voting bloc on the board; it also
provides a catalyst for tenant groups to organize around: the board's annual
public hearings are largely dominated by extensive tenant participation, as
tenants provide testimony and appeal for low rent increases.14 9
Yet these modes of institutionalized participation amount to less than
they seem. The RGB, for example, does succeed in catalyzing organizing
among tenant groups, but it is unclear how much autonomous power and
influence tenant groups can leverage through this particular foothold.
Historically, the fact of mayoral appointment has meant that, while formally
independent and bound to make its decisions on the basis of housing market
data generated by RGB staff and state economic analysis, the RGB has voted
largely in the spirit of the mayoral administration.' Thus the RGB voted for
massive rent increases under Mayor Bloomberg-despite the severe
economic pressures of the post-financial crises recession on tenant incomes,
wages, and affordability.'"' Under Mayor de Blasio, the RGB has generally
been more tenant-friendly. It is also notable that the balance of power on the
Board is held not by the tenants and their two seats, but by the five "public"
members, who on their own constitute a voting majority even if both tenants
148.

See N.Y. UNCONSOL. §26-510; N.Y. UNCONSOL.

§ 8624.

See also, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES

BOARD, http://www.nycrgb.org/html/aboutlintro/toc.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
149. See Mireya Navarro, New York City Board Votes to Free Regulated Rents on One-Year
Leases, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/nyregion/new-york-cityboard-votes-to-freeze-rents-on-one-year-leases.htm; Mireya Navarro, For the Second Year, Rents in
Some Stabilized Apartments in New York City Will Not Increase, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/nyregion/for-the-second-year-rents-in-some-stabilizedapartments-in-new-york-city-will-not-increase.html; Khorri Atkinson, New York City Approves Rent
Increasesfor RegulatedApartments, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/
nyregion/new-york-city-approves-rent-increases-for-stabilized-apartments.html. Note that the Author

has served as a Public Member of the RGB from 2015-2016. This account is based on publicly-available
information and the Author's experience of the institution.
150. Note that the Author has served as a Public Member of the RGB from 2015-2016. This
account is based on publicly available information and the Author's experience of the institution.
151. See NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, Apartment Orders 1 through 49 (19692018), https://wwwl .nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/guidelines/aptorders2018.pdf (last visited

Feb. 4, 2018).
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and landlords vote in opposition. This is by design, in theory to enable
neutral expertise to shape the RGB decisions. 152 Indeed, the requirements for
the public members emphasize experience and expertise in housing and
economic development matters.1 5 3
Furthermore, even where the physical presence of tenant organizing
groups through hearings and formal seats on the Board are successful in
influencing the 'swing' votes of the public members, there is a further
problem: the RGB itself lacks significant authority to address the more
structural problems of housing inequality.15 4 It is telling that many of the
concerns raised by tenants in public hearings involve challenges far outside
the RGB's relatively narrow rate-setting role. Concerns raised range from
pleas for individual redress from difficulties like landlord harassment, forced
eviction, poor living conditions, attempts to force tenants to sign new and
often skewed contracts, to structural concerns about gentrification, rezoning,
and widening inequality.155 These tenants engage the RGB as a forum to
exercise influence and make themselves heard; yet the RGB lacks the
authority to address either individualized grievances or systemic policy
challenges.
In contrast to the Oakland commission, the RGB is not empowered to
provide reports or conduct investigations.' The RGB staff produces
thorough analyses of housing data including on landlord operating costs and
overall tenant and city economic conditions.'"' These reports are important
to inform the deliberations of the RGB, and are developed drawing on data
shared from city and state agencies. But the RGB itself does not conduct
inspections, does not have the power to bring enforcement actions against
violations, and is not formally charged with issuing reports or
recommendations to either the Mayor or the City Council.15 1 While RGB
members will often make statements in the public vote, this is a far cry from
the kind of reporting, enforcement, and public agenda-shaping power the
Oakland commission can exercise.
152. Note that the Author has served as a Public Member of the RGB from 2015-2016. This
account is based on publicly available information and the Author's experience of the institution.
153. N.Y. UNCONSOL. § 26-510(a).
154. See e.g. Timothy Collins, An Introduction to the NYC Rent Guidelines Board and the Rent
Stabilization System, NYC RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/

about/history-rent-regulation-and-the-rgb.page (last visited Feb 4, 2018).
155. This assertion is based on the author's personal experience as a board member on the RGB.
156. See EBASE and Revive Oakland Win Big, supra note 130; Rahman, The Key to Making
Economic Development More Equitable, supra note 130; EBASE, supra note 131.
157. See, e.g., N.Y.C RENT GUtDELINES BOARD, 2017 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT (May 25, 2017),
http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf reports/I 7HSR.pdf; N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD,
2017 INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY STUDY (last visited Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.nycrgb.org/
downloads/research/pdf reports/ial7.pdf.
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See EBASE and Revive Oakland Win Big, supra note 130; Rahman, The Key to Making

Economic Development More Equitable, supra note 130; EBASE, supra note 13 1.
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V. POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The examples described in Part IV above are illustrative of the larger
argument of this paper. In addressing the problem of disparate power,
institutional design of administrative agencies and processes can play a
major role. Such power-shifting institutional design can forge the kinds of
linkages between constituencies and institutions that can reshape the
distribution of power and influence.
In political science and sociology, scholars have suggested that policies
and institutions which forge more robust links with beneficiary communities
are more likely to be durable."' But as the examples in Part IV above
suggest, this interface between policymakers and constituencies need not be
a passive one; rather that relationship can operate in vastly different ways
depending on the design of the institutions and policies in question. As we
will see below, this suggests that a key focal point for designing powershifting policies lies in reforming this institution-constituency interface. The
Part will then draw out from the case studies above two specific types of
strategies through which constituency power can be expanded by policy
design.
Building on these case studies, I argue for two general power-shifting
design principles. First, power can be shifted by creating institutions and
processes that are visible and that have actual power and jurisdictional scope.
This helps make community organizing more likely and effective, orienting
claims-making by constituencies around a clear target for mobilization-and
a target empowered to actually respond to those claims. Second, power can
be shifted by increasing the leverage that such stakeholder groups might have
on the policymaking institution, through various mechanisms of
representation or participation.

A. POWER AS A PROPERTY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL-CONSTITUENCY
INTERFACE

For our purposes, we can understand power as the ability to change the
outcome or probability of outcomes in favor of one's own preferences or
values. Crucially, power need not manifest in direct, intentional influence on
policy outcomes; oftentimes, rather, power is manifest in how other actors
modify behavior in anticipation of another party's views, and in how the
powerful actor can become influential without explicitly seeking a specific
policy shift." Power, so defined, is extraordinarily unequally distributed in
159.

See infra Part V.A.

160. See Jane Mansbridge et al., supra note 89 at 80 n.44; accord., Levinson, supra note 1, at 39
(defining power as the "ability of political actors to control outcomes of contested decision-making
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contemporary American political economy. Crucially, these inequities of
power often operate through a variety of channels of influence, from direct
lobbying to "softer" forms of influence based on shared culture, norms, or
class background.
As the CFPB/FSOC and the Oakland/RGB cases suggest, constituency
power is greater where citizens are able to contest state action, forcing state
actors to give an account of their policies through the imposition of
sanctions, procedural requirements, and constraints. 16 1 But this ability to
mobilize and pressure state actors-and the degree of influence that might
arise from such mobilization-are products of the institutional structures
through which policy is made, and around which such civil society
mobilization is oriented.
Public choice theory has long since struggled with the classic power
imbalance between diffuse interests and concentrated interests: even if the
former might be more numerous or have more critical demands, the latter are
more likely to be able to engage in coordinated, concerted, and ultimately
impactful policy advocacy.1 62 This systematic tendency is exacerbated by the
realities of power disparities which can operate through a variety of other
channels as well: shared ideological, social, and cultural backgrounds with
policymakers; financial influence; influence through providing information
and research support for low-capacity policymaking bodies, and more. How
might we mitigate these disparities in power and influence? The case studies
above raise an important implication: the ability of constituencies to exercise
power-whether they are residents in Oakland or consumers in the financial
reform debate-stems not just from the organizational strength of these
groups in civil society, but also from their interfaces with administrative
policymakers. These linkages are what enable these constituencies to
exercise political power and influence over, say, the Army Base Project or
the implementation of consumer protection regulations.
To broaden this intuition, we can turn to law and social science accounts
of how institutions and civil society groups interact. Three different
literatures offer some indicators of how institutional design can alter the
dynamics of civil society and constituent organizing and mobilizing, to offset

processes and secure their preferred polices") (citing Robert Dahl's classic WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961)).

161.

See Mark Philp, Delimiting Democratic Accountability, 57 POL. STUD. 28, 32-35 (2009). See

generally Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the

Study ofPoliticalRepresentationandDemocracy, 103 AM. POL. SCL REV. 214 (2009) (outlining different
dimensions of responsiveness and accountability for various types of state officials exercising delegated
power, including elected and administrative officials).
162.

See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS (Harv. U. Press ed., 1971).
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these systematic advantages for more concentrated, well-resourced, and
well-connected groups.
1.

Public Law MediatingBetween Interests andInstitutions

In his recent HarvardLaw Review Foreword on power and public law,
Daryl Levinson rightly notes a central challenge for the problem of balancing
political power: a basic tension between a focus on balancing power through
institutions on the one hand-following Madison's view of the separation of
powers in Federalist 51-and balancing powers through interest group
pluralism on the other, in keeping with Madison's argument in Federalist
10.163 In place of this duality, Levinson suggests that we need to view both
interests and institutions in relationship to one another, by "passing through"
the power of governmental institutions to unpack the configuration of
interest group powers that might lie behind particular institutions.' Thus
the formal separation of powers in public law operates dynamically in
relationship to the background alignment of parties and interest groups,
shaping if and when the different branches in fact operate to check or
empower one another. 65 Similarly, federalism as an institution can provide
checks on the central government, but these dynamics are shaped by the
partisan and interest group alignments within states: so Texas and California
are more likely to operate as checks on the federal government when they
are vehicles for partisan interests in opposition to the party in power in
Washington.166
This approach of "passing power through" institutions to the background
configuration of interests is important for mapping and diagnosing existing
power dynamics. But it also carries some implications for power-shifting
institutional design. For starters, the idea of "passing power through"
suggests that it is not enough to create institutions or processes on paper and
expect these institutions to gain traction as checks and balances on existing
power centers; rather, for institutional levers to have real force, there needs
to be political actors-interests-that lie behind those institutions, and are
motivated to make full use of those institutions themselves. 167
As Kate Andrias rightly notes, if we are to actually redress disparities of
power, we need to go a step further, to develop "a range of structural, power163.

Levinson, supranote 1, at 36.

164.

See generally id. at 40, 84.

165.

See generally Daryl Levinson & Richard Piles, SeparationofParties,Not Powers, 119 HARV.

L. REV. 2311 (2006).
166. See generally, Jessica Bullman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1077 (2014);
see also Seifter, supranote 41.

167. For a similar point with respect to the separation of powers, see generally David Pozen, SelfHelp and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014).
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shifting reforms to our law, our economy, and our democracy"-in
particular, by examining how current and historical social movement like
labor and the Black Lives Matter movement have worked to build their core
capacity to contest and exercise power.16 8 Altering the existing balance of
power thus requires finding ways to bolster the underlying capacity of
affected but relatively under-powered interests to exercise power and
influence on decision-makers. Part of this has to do with creating new
institutional powers and levers, but part of it also requires linking those levers
to underlying interests or constituencies.
2.

Constituency Effects and Policy Sustainability

There is a growing literature in political science documenting the ways
in which particular institutional and policy designs can foster these linkages
with constituencies, making it more likely that these groups will identify
with-and thus mobilize to protect-these institutions and policies. The
classic example here is Social Security: as a universal benefit, Social
Security has played a formative role in shaping the identities of many
Americans, ultimately becoming an example of a deeply-embedded social
policy that is very difficult to overturn because of this depth of identification
and public support.169
By contrast, policies that are more "submerged"-hidden from view
such that many beneficiaries do not even know they benefit from an
institution or government program-are much more easily overturned, and
do little to generate public support for or identification with the institutions
responsible for providing the benefits in the first place. Suzanne Mettlerl 70
thus contrasts the design and politics of the Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction ("HMID") or food stamp benefits with Social Security to

highlight this point: the HMID is a benefit that is politically difficult to
overturn because so many constituencies benefit from it, yet it is submerged
within the tax code, and unlike Social Security, because few beneficiaries
are even aware that they benefit from a government policy or regulatory
arrangement.17 1 These policies do not generate a systematic awareness,
identification, or political affinity on the part of their many beneficiaries. The
168. Kate Andrias, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 6-8 (2016). See
also, Andrias, Separationsof Wealth, supra note 1.
169. See generally, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (Cambridge U. Press ed., 2002); PAUL
PIERSON,
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RETRENCHMENT (Cambridge U. Press ed., 1994); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND

MOTHERS (The Belknap Press of Hary. U. Press ed., 1992); Andrea Campbell, Self-Interest, Social
Security, and the DistinctiveParticipationPatternsofSenior Citizens, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 565 (2002).
170. See generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: How INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011).
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result is that submerged policies do not have the same kinds of constituencyforming effects on beneficiaries as open entitlements. As Mettler argues,
"democracy depends, first of all, on citizens having the means and capacity
to form meaningful opinions" about public policy, but "how can citizens
establish their own views about its politics--opinions that reflect their values
and interests-if they have only limited or faulty information about those
policies, or have never heard of them?"l 72 Opaque or hidden regulatory
schemes and policy designs exacerbate pre-existing disparities of political
power and organizational capacity: such submerged policy designs "easily
capture and hold the attention of organized interests," but "fail to make
themselves apparent as social programs to most citizens who use them,"
exacerbating the difficulties of organized, countervailing collective action.173
Viewed from the standpoint of power and linking constituencies'
interests with institutions, this literature suggests that "policy
sustainability"' 74 is largely a product of the degree to which a policy can
generate such positive, public support from beneficiaries, while creating
incentives that prevent potential critics from mobilizing in opposition to the
policy."' While framed as a way to entrench policies and institutions, the
mechanisms outlined by this literature operate through changes to the
distribution of power as a result of these constituency effects. By making
policies and institutions more visible, and more closely bound to the
identities and interests of constituencies, we can expand the incentives and
likelihood that those constituencies will engage in collective political action
to defend the policy or institution with which they identify. In essence, this
solves the collective action problem, and helps spur more regular
mobilization in defense of the institution or policy. Yet this linkage between
interest and institution still relies on public awareness, and is largely felt
through public opinion and electoral channels. These instruments are
relatively blunt for exercising power, particularly given the myriad of policy
questions decided on by legislative and regulatory bodies outside of the
public eye and between elections.
3.

Social Movement Theory andPoliticalOpportunity Structure

We can see a more granular account of how institutional structures can
incentivize and catalyze more specific forms of constituency voice and
participation in the literature on social movement theory. This literature
suggests that the ability of civil society groups to form durable, long-term
172. Id. at 26.
173. Id. at 46.
174. See Eric Patashnik, After the Public Interest Prevails: The PoliticalSustainability of Policy
Reform, 16 GOVERNANCE 203, 207 (2003).
175. Id.
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organizations capable of exercising power depends a great deal on their
internal organizational capacity, as well as the larger institutional context in
which these groups operate.
Social movements can be understood as a larger network of individuals
connected by shared experiences and commitments. These movements can
be linked to a variety of formal organizations, and through organized
political activity make claims on institutions and policymakers. 176 As
sociologists Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and others have argued, the ability
of movements to be successful in exercising political power and winning
campaigns depends on a variety of conditions, including the presence of
mobilizing narratives that can frame their values and demands,
organizational resources and capacity, and "political opportunity
structure"-the ways in which existing policymaking institutions create
opportunities for movements to make effective claims on policymakers.1 77
Political opportunity structure in turn, can inform the strategies and
organizational capacities of movements, as movements tend to build a
"repertoire" of expertise and skills specialized around the most effective
methods of exercising real power and influence.178
This social movement literature suggests that beyond the constituency
effects identified by political scientists like Campbell, Skocpol, Mettler, and
others, there are more fine-grained ways in which institutional structures can
catalyze movements and civil society organizations to build and exercise
power based on the types of institutionalopportunitiesfor influence.

B. CATALYZING CONSTITUENT POWER
This literature taken collectively suggests that institutional design can
play a large role in shaping the terrain upon which social movements and
civil society actors operate. Institutions and processes for policymaking are
not just neutral responders to the external pressures of interest groups.
Rather, they themselves shape the political terrain on which individuals and
constituencies attempt to exercise political power. Thus, institutions and
processes can be designed in ways that pro-actively catalyze and facilitate
the ability of groups-particularly diffuse, under-resourced, marginalized, or
traditionally overlooked groups-to be better able to exercise power and
influence.
Expanding this capacity for influence, however, requires looking at both
the nature of interest group organization and the institutional context in

&

176. See generally, CHARLES TILLY, CONTENTIOUS PERFORMANCES (2008).
177. See generally, SIDNEY TARROW & CHARLES TILLY, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (2009); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT (1994).
178. See, e.g., HAHRIE HAN, How ORGANIZATIONS MAKE ACTIVISTS: Civic ASSOCIATIONS
LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 68-69 (2014); TILLY, supra note 176, at 148-49.

2018]

Policymakingas Power-Building

357

which these organizations act. When interest groups and organizations
exercise power, we often tend to focus on the ability to shape a specific
policy decision or outcome. And indeed, much of the literature on social
movements and organizations often examines case studies at this level of
analysis, particularly how civil society groups mobilize and secure specific
legal or policy victories.179 But the likelihood and frequency of such policy
victories is shaped by the distribution of power at deeper levels. Specific
policy decisions are themselves constrained by the power to set agendas to
begin with; if an issue or option is not even considered "viable" or "on the
table," no degree of influence on the policy decision itself will be effective.
Furthermore, the ability to set agendas is similarly a function of even deeper
background structures about who can organize and exercise influence, and
who has a seat at the table to begin with."so The project of redressing or
balancing power disparities thus must approach the distribution of power at
this deeper, third-level of institutionalstructureandorganizationalcapacity,
rather than focusing on more surface-level issues of specific policy disputes
or outcomes.
To understand this focus on structural allocations of power, consider for
example, the battle for labor power in today's economy. Among the central
challenges for workers organizing today are specific policy questions such
as the minimum wage, or fair work-week scheduling. But the ability of
workers to drive such specific policy changes, however, is a product of
background structural conditions. Can labor groups mobilize a wide enough
constituency of workers across different employers, sectors, and
geographies? Can they organize such ad hoc mobilization into long-term,
durable, movement groups that can maintain sustained advocacy pressure?
Are there policymaking institutions to which these claims can be directed?
Are such appeals ad hoc and one-off instances, or can they be more deeply
institutionalized so that workers have a more sustained seat at the table,
shaping policy on a forward-looking and ongoing basis, rather than battling
for after-the-fact redress? Labor law has long been criticized for imposing
structural and historical constraints on the ability of labor to forge durable
cross-sector coalitions that can exercise ongoing power and influence on the
policies of the workplace, for example by excluding many 16w-wage,
precarious types of work, like domestic workers and farm workers-areas
179. See generally, Scott L. Cummings, EmpiricalStudies of Law and Social Change: What Is the
Field? What Are the Questions?, 2013 Wisc. L. REv. 171, (2013) (describing how the law and social
movements literature generally examines case studies of specific campaign mobilizations resulting in
legal and policy change); see also Cummings supranote 179, at 184 (noting the tendency of this literature
to focus on specific litigation strategies or mobilization efforts).
180. See generally, JOiN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE & REBELLION IN
AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1982); Archon Fung, UnderstandingPower, GETTYSBURG PROJECT ON
Civic ENGAGEMENT, Jun. 2017 (on file with author).
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which now comprise a huge chunk of the modem labor force, and also
disproportionately represent communities of color.'81 While some battles
over labor organizing and policy are about specific surface issues like wages,
others concern deeper structural allocations of power. Indeed, these are the
stakes of so-called "right to work" laws (and the contrast to the push for "card
check" laws) that would undermine (or expand) the long-term capacity of
labor to forge effective, mass civil society organizations.1 8 2
In terms of our case studies above, this difference between one-off
impact and institutionalized power and influence is also evidenced by the
difference between the degree of influence that Oakland communities have
through the Army Base Commission, contrasted to the occasional and ad hoc
influence of residents in other CBA battles. Consider the ways in which the
presence of the CFPB radically changed the capacity of consumers to drive
policy change in financial regulation, in comparison to the pre-Dodd-Frank
era.
From the standpoint of power, then, it is crucial to approach institutional
design questions with a focus on the interactions between institutions and
social movement or civil society organizing.183 This is not to say that there
exists a pure power-balancing process or institutional structure. Procedural
protections are certainly susceptible to capture and influence by more wellresourced and sophisticated players. 8 4 Nevertheless, under conditions of
already-existing disparities of capacity and influence, we can identify two
dimensions where institutional change can shift the terrain of power and
influence in a more equitable and balanced direction: increasing the visibility
and authority of policymaking institutions themselves, and creating more
points of leverage through which stakeholders can influence policymaking
in those institutions themselves.
This linkage between constituencies on the one hand, and policymakers
on the other, can in turn be institutionalized at a variety of levels. At the most
micro-level, the link can operate through an affected constituency's
connection to a specific office holder or specific agency personnel: the
appointees on the RGB, or staffers in the CFPB's Consumer Affairs Unit.
Alternatively, this link might be institutionalized at the level of an agency

181. See generally, DAVID ROLF, FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING
AMERICA (2016).
182. See e.g. Rogers, supra note 10; Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 10; Nelson

Lichtenstein, STATE OF TilE UNION 177 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2010); Michelle Miller and Eric H.
Bernstein, New Frontiers of Worker Power: Challenges and Opportunities in the Modern Economy,
ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Feb. 15, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/new-frontiers-worker-power/.
183. See e.g. Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supranote 1, at 497-99.

184.
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2018]

Policymakingas Power-Building

359

office-what Margo Schlanger has dubbed "office of goodness."' Such
offices codify and institutionalize a substantive ethos and commitment to a
particular mission-for example, civil rights protections or internal
dissenting checks and balances within an agency. By providing advice,
assistance, or even independent investigation of complaints and checking of
agency analyses, these offices can provide an institutionalized form of
countervailing power within the agency. 86
But crucially, as Schlanger and others have framed it, such offices are
for the most part dependent on the rest of the agency, particularly its
leadership, for their autonomy and independence.187 To serve as a foothold
for countervailing power, these offices would need to be somewhat
autonomous. Long-standing proposals for "proxy advocacy"' 88 and.
"regulatory public defenders"l 89 would institutionalize such greater
autonomy to make this kind of countervailing power possible. These
footholds could also be more forceful in checking agency assumptions and
balancing the power and influence of other groups within the agency
ecosystem, if they in part possessed a more direct connection to "client"
constituencies. Indeed, this is arguably what makes the CFPB so powerfuland so threatening. In a lot of ways the entire agency is a kind of massive
"Office of Goodness" but with greater autonomy, independence, resources,
and strong formal and informal ties to its core constituency. The combination
of participatory and representative mechanisms with the independent
funding of the CFPB and its status as an agency operating alongside other
financial regulation agencies makes it an extremely effective channel for
countervailing power. Thus the "representativeness" or constituency-linkage
within an agency is something of a fractal phenomenon, potentially existing
185.

Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in FederalAgencies, 36

CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 55 (2014).
186. Id. (In this Schlanger's account relates to other studies of internal checks and balances between
offices within the same agency.). See e.g. Daniel Farber & Anne O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries,
105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming). Neal K. Katyal, InternalSeparationofPowers: Checking Today's Most

DangerousBranchfrom Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314 (2006) (describing internal checks within agencies);
Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, (2017) [hereinafter Subdelegating
Powers] (modeling the incentives for agency heads to subdelegate certain functions to other offices within
the agency); Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015); Daphna Renan,

PoolingPowers, 115 COLUM L. REV. 211 (2015).
187. Schlanger, supra note 185, at 61 ("Offices of Goodness are internal and dependent on their
agency."); see also Daniel Carpenter, InternalGovernance ofAgencies: The Sieve, the Shove, the Show,

129 HAR. L. REV. F. 189 (2016) (warning that agency subdelegation of this sort can just as often be used
to silence internal dissent as to enable it); Nou, Subdelegating Powers, supra note 186 (noting that
subdelegation of power to an internal office is more likely to occur when the incentives and goals of the
agency head and the suboffice align).
188. See Schwarcz, supra note 106, at 4 (examining case studies of how proxy advocacy and
tripartism has helped mitigate the risk of capture in state-level insurance regulation).
189. See Mariano-Florentino Cu6Har, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,

491 (2005).
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at levels ranging from the individual policymaker, to the office, to the agency
as a whole. Here too, the lesson is one of institutional flexibility: there are
many routes towards facilitating these linkages and thereby rebalancing
power relationships within a particular sector or policy area.
In some cases, legislation could create administrative structures and
processes designed to facilitate the linkages between constituencies and
policymakers, along the lines sketched above. Thus, statutes like the creation
of the CFPB or the local ordinances forming the Oakland Commission could
be models for future legislative institutional design. But in other cases, these
power-shifting processes can be pursued, at least in part, through ordinary
administrative discretion. The CFPB does have a unique statutory structure,
-but many of its practices that expanded the influence and leverage of
community groups could be adapted through ordinary regulatory discretion
over ad hoc or rule-based procedures.
These power-shifting strategies need not to be limited to public actors.
literature has highlighted the ways in which the day-to-day
growing
A
governance of various services and processes involve a wide array of public
and private actors, linked together by outsourcing contracts, grants, or other
legal arrangements.' 90 These legal tools could presumably incorporate to
some degree the kinds of procedural arrangements sketched above as part of
their contractual terms-along the lines of CBAs themselves.
The rest of this Part develops some more portable strategies for
institutional and policy design that can help balance disparities of political
power, in particular by focusing on ways in which institutional design and
policymaking process can create different interfaces between stakeholder
and constituency groups on the one hand, and policymakers on the other.
These institutions and interfaces can be designed to either exacerbate or
mitigate power disparities. Furthermore, by focusing on a set of
generalizable approaches to institutional design, this approach to powerbalancing can be used and applied in a variety of administrative bodies and
institutional contexts.
C. STRATEGIES FOR POWER-SHIFTING POLICY DESIGN

The examples above help highlight how these power-shifting principles
might operate in practice. Consider the CFPB and FSOC contrast. Both of
these agencies exemplify the first set of considerations, consolidating
190. See, e.g., JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOw, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1-9 (2009); Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The Human Side of
Public-PrivatePartnerships:From New DealRegulation to Administrative Law Management, 102 IOWA

L. REV. 883, 893 (2017); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sPretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 725-30
(2010); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sProgeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1040-42 (2013); Eloise Pasachoff,
Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248,

258 (2014).
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policymaking authority that was previously fragmented and disjointed, and
creating a visible target for policy advocacy and mobilization. But the two
institutions diverge significantly on the second set of considerations around
points of leverage. The FSOC, despite its committee-like structure with
representatives from various financial regulatory agencies, does little to
provide entry points or points of influence for affected constituencies. The
CFPB by contrast, has made constituency engagement a central feature of its
practice.' 9 ' As a result, the CFPB has magnified the influence and impact of
a variety of constituencies on federal regulation writ large, from consumers
to student debtors to victims of financial fraud. Even the CFPB falls short in
the relative degree of informality and discretion in its civic engagement
efforts. The complaint database and the pro-active convenings of
stakeholders are both initiatives that the CFPB itself has put forward. This is
indicative of just how much more agencies can do by deploying their own
discretion to create more power-balancing processes-but it also
underscores that these initiatives can be just as easily eliminated should
agency personnel and priorities change.
The Oakland Commission and New York RGB contrast is similarly
instructive. Both of these local administrative bodies offer statutory
measures to enhance formal representation for affected constituencieslocal residents and community groups in Oakland and tenants in the RGB.
Yet the power that these constituencies exercise as a result is vastly different.
In the RGB, tenants do not at all hold the balance of power, in contrast to the
allocation of seats in the Oakland Commission. 192 Furthermore, the Oakland
Commission itself has far more power and authority to begin with than the
RGB: while the rent increase rate is in a sense more impactful because it
affects the entire city, the RGB itself only sets the rate.' 93 The RGB cannot
address grievances, issue reports, or monitor compliance.' 94 These functions
are to some degree met by other regulatory bodies at the state and city level,
but these bodies are themselves scattered and fragmented, with relatively
limited capacities of their own. The Oakland Commission, by contrast,
though more focused on the Army Base Project in particular (rather than all
Oakland developments), has a much greater degree of power and influence
over the project itself.' 95

191. See infra Part V.A.
192.
193.

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.

194. See ld.
195. See ld
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Two Design Principlesfor Power-Shifting

Taken together, these examples illustrate the importance of two general
features of policy and institutional design that can shape power dynamics.
One set of design questions concerns the scope of agency authority. A second
concerns the existence of institutionalized points of leverage that enable
constituencies to force policy change. Both of these conditions together can
combine to generate a greater shift in power and influence.
A first set of institutional design choices for balancing power involves
the consolidationof institutionalauthority and visibility.
A central feature of the American policymaking terrain is that it is in fact
extremely difficult to navigate. We have an extraordinarily fragmented
institutional ecosystem. There is a huge array of policymaking bodies
divided horizontally, not only the Federal separation of powers, but also the
array of regulatory agencies that exercise overlapping and clashing
jurisdictions in some cases, while leaving in place huge regulatory gaps in
authority in other cases. This horizontal fragmentation is multiplied by
vertical fragmentation between federal, state, and local level institutions.
Such opacity and fragmentation represent a structural feature that is, on
balance, problematic from the standpoint of balancing power and enabling
countervailing power. While it is true that some degree of fragmentation can
be helpful in providing more arenas for countervailing views,' 9 6 there is a
tradeoff between such fragmentation and actual policymaking impact.
Furthermore, it is more likely that in an extremely fragmented and complex
terrain, more well-resourced, sophisticated, and well-connected groups are
likely to be able to navigate their way and make themselves heard, while
less-resourced groups fall short, appealing to the wrong office or not even
knowing where to appeal in the first place. For countervailing power and
movement organizing to thrive, there must be a visible governmental target
to which claims can be brought, and which has the authority and capacity to
address those claims. Without a clear and efficacious target, it is difficult to
mobilize-and even more difficult to convert mobilization into a policy
change. Thus, we can think of this as a jurisdictional consolidation
condition, and view it as having an inverse-U relationship with balanced
power: too much consolidation, and it seems likely that already-powerful
groups will capture and dominate the policymaking apparatus; too little, and
those same powerful groups will out-maneuver other constituencies to exert
maximal leverage.
Closely related to the scope of jurisdiction question is the scope of
institutional authority. Where institutions lack the actual authority and
196.

See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1759-60 (2005)

(arguing that decentralization is valuable precisely because it allows minority views to be tested out in

practice through local or state level bodies).
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capacity to shape social or economic conditions, they are less useful levers
through which interests and constituencies can exercise power. Stated
another way, the promise of actual "influence over a slice of state power"
creates a "powerful incentive" for participation,1 9 7 and thus facilitates the
capacity of constituencies to mobilize, organize, and exercise power. These
jurisdiction and authority dynamics are exacerbated by problems of policy
complexity, opacity, and visibility.
Such consolidated institutional authority and visibility can be understood
as accelerating and deepening the kinds of constituency effects described
above, raising the incentives for groups to mobilize and organize-and thus
forging a greater link between interests and the institutions themselves.
Even once institutions are consolidated and visible enough to help
generate countervailing mobilization, organization, and advocacy, the
capacity of these constituencies to exercise power depends on a further
additional set of conditions: whether there are sufficient hooks and levers
through which constituencies can shape or monitor the policies themselves,
and in so doing build and exercise meaningful political power. There must
be an interface through which these constituencies can engage with
policymakers, and have meaningful voice over actual policy decisions.
Without such an interface, mobilized groups face an uphill battle in being
heard and having real influence. Institutions and processes need to provide
these stakeholders and constituencies with real hooks and levers through
which they can exercise effective countervailing power, thereby forcing
decision-makers to respond to a wider range of voices, concerns, and ideas.
So long as participation remains ad hoc or at the whim of the policymaker,
it will necessarily be thin, disempowered, less likely to serve as a mode of
empowerment or inclusion.
There are a variety of mechanisms through which constituencies can
interface with different institutions of policymaking. One set of approaches
would seek to codify different types of interest representation within
policymaking bodies. Representation here is not just about the personnel
within the decision-making body; rather, representation can operate more
197. Archon Fung, Varieties of Participationin Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
(SPECIAL ISSuE) 66, 69 (2006); Archon Fung, Recipesfor Public Spheres. Eight InstitutionalDesign
Choices and Their Consequences, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 338, 346 (2003). See generally, MICHAEL MCGuIRE
AND ROBERT AGRANOFF, COLLABORATIVE PUB. MGMT. (2003). See also ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED
PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 71 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2006) (Participants
"must believe that there is some benefit to participation: that meetings are not just talk shops or venting
sessions."); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 46 (Cambridge U. Press ed.,

1976) (The very motivation to engage in political participation requires that individuals feel a "sense of
political efficacy."); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1980)
("Power and participation are inextricably linked: a sense ofpowerlessness tends to produce apathy rather
than participation, while the existence of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do
so.").
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dynamically as a way to link social movements and civil society actors
outside government, to the workings within government."' Another set of
mechanisms would seek to expand the opportunities for meaningful
participation of constituencies in shaping, implementing, or monitoring
policies themselves. While we have a standard set of tools for transparency
and public comment, these tools would have to be modified and employed
differently for participation to shift the balance of power.
These two considerations complement and reinforce one another. From
the standpoint of social movements or relatively marginalized
constituencies, a clearly visible and consolidated institutional target with
meaningful authority can help focus and catalyze organizing efforts and
orient organizations around an interlocutor more likely to be able to respond.
At the same time, exercising power will be difficult absent hooks and levers
for exercising influence within these target institutions. Inversely, there may
be institutions that offer useful hooks and levers that make it easier for
constituencies to plug in to decision-making. But if those decisions and
policies are hidden from view, or if the institutions themselves have limited
scope and jurisdiction, the value of such participation is diminished.
Participationand Power in Monitoring: Citizen Audits
Such participation and bottom-up pressure can be implemented at a
variety of points in the policymaking process. We tend to think of the
engagement of constituencies in context of ex ante consultations before a
policy is set. This is the stance of notice-and-comment procedures,
negotiated rulemaking, and of ad hoc consultations with stakeholder groups.
But often more productive and effective forms of countervailing power take
place downstream, through monitoring and oversight of policy outcomes,
which then feed back into future new policy decisions. This is the way the
CBA process in Oakland operates: grassroots communities are engaged
primarily in ex post monitoring of outcomes along a prior set of goals and
standards. 199
More generally, this role of countervailing power in ex post monitoring
represents an under-utilized power-shifting design-a strategy that we might
think of as "citizen audits." 2 0 Through greater participation, citizens can act
as diffuse networks to track the degree to which regulatory bodies implement
2.

198. See e.g. Urbinati & Warren, supra note 82, at 388-90; See generally, Lisa Disch, Toward a
Mobilization Conception ofDemocraticRepresentation, 105 AM. POL. SCL REV. 100 (2011).

199.

See discussion supra, part IV.

200. For a generalized account of how such participatory monitoring might work, see generally
Sabeel Rahman, From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, PERSP. POL.

(forthcoming 2018).
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their policies effectively. 201 Such participation can check the manipulations
of private actors by facilitating regulatory enforcement, while also protecting
against potentially lax enforcement by regulators themselves. Communities
engaged and mobilized in this way can devise their own performance goals,
indicators, or targets, which can then be used to evaluate the performance of
policymakers and implementation through issuing audits, report cards, and
diagnosing blockages, slowdowns, or implementation failures.202 Policies
can be made amenable to such participatory monitoring through further
design features: first, providing the means for citizens to monitor
outcomes-such as the articulation of standards that outline the goals of the
policy and the collecting of data or other metrics on outcomes; second,
providing citizens with real leverage by empowering them to trigger actual
policy and enforcement proceedings; and third, making these findings and
activities public.203
As Tara Melish has argued, this strategy of oppositional, adversarial, yet
constructive engagement that leverages grassroots monitoring and data
collection represents a new pattern of human rights advocacy which
emphasizes a shift from "nonnegotiable material demands and mass
confrontation" and from claims of right, to "process-oriented" approaches
that attempt to create institutional frameworks that encourage
accountability. 2' Through participatory monitoring of public standards and
goals-for example, via "report cards," citizen auditing, development of
alternative proposed budgets, and monitoring of performance indicatorsthese grassroots groups can track public policy outcomes, diagnose failures
and slowdowns, and advocate for policy changes. 2 05 These citizen audits are
a potential alternative strategy for generating accountability and building
201.

See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, COUNTER-DEMOCRACY: POLITICS IN AN AGE OF DISTRUST

(Arthur Goldhammer, trans., 2008); Melish, supra note 50.
202. See Melish, supra note 50, at 89-98.
203. This type of countervailing power through monitoring, implementation, and enforcement is
somewhat akin to conventional legal accounts of the "private attorney general" in that it deputizes civil
society and private actors to pro-actively facilitate enforcement by incentivizing them, in part by their
own self-interest. This can expand the enforcement capacity of the agency itself. But where private
attorney general models have raised concerns about potentially sapping the capacity of the state, the

models described above such as the CRA or the Oakland Army Base CBA indicate that institutional

&

structures actually expand state capacity and provide an independent lever through which civil society
actors can hold both private third parties (like banks or developers) as well as lax regulators to account.
On the private attorney general and its potential limits, see e.g., Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang,
Herbert Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662 (2013) (describing benefits
of private enforcement regimes); Burbank et al., supra note 203, at 667 (describing the disadvantages of
private enforcement); Pamela Karlan, Disarmingthe PrivateAttorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183
(2002); William Rubenstein, On What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND.

L. REV. 2129 (2004) (mapping the different forms of private attorney general lawyers and distinguishing
them from public law enforcement officers).

204. Melish, supra note 50, at 55, 73-74.
205. Id. at 76-99.
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political power among marginalized groups. Such models have proliferated
in an international human rights context. For example, they have been
documented in instances like India's right to information movement and the
impact it had on worker and farmer organization around anti-corruption
efforts,206 and the use of digital participatory mapping tools in holding
service delivery accountable in Kenya.207 In the U.S., similar forms of
participatory monitoring and countervailing power have been set up through
the proliferation of state and local human rights enforcement bodies. These
commissions serve as an institutional target and focal point for community
mobilization, while monitoring outcomes offers a way for those
communities to exercise influence and leverage. 208 Arguably, participatory
monitoring has also informed regulatory structures in different ways as well,
such as the role of grassroots groups in monitoring and reporting compliance
problems with banks under the minority lending requirements of the
Community Reinvestment Act, 20 9 or recent state-level experiments with
engaging organized labor in monitoring wage theft and compliance with
workplace standards.210
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER-BULDING
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC THEORY
This approach to power-building through administrative policy design
raises a number of important theoretical implications for how we might
better conceptualize participation, representation, and the role of institutions
in reshaping power. It also raises implications for legal scholarship,
particularly in the areas of public law, power, administrative law, and law
and social movements.
206. See generally, Rob Jenkins & Anne Marie Goetz, Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical
Implications ofthe Right-to-Information Movement in India, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 603 (1999).
207. See generally, e.g., Molly K. Land, Democratizing Human Rights Fact-Finding, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING (Philip Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds., 2015).

208.

See Melish, supra note 50, at 68-110 (showing examples in a state and local context).

209. For a further discussion of the Community Reinvestment Act as an example of participatory
regulation, see RAHMAN, supra note 11, at 161-63; Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The
Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513 (2005); Raymond H. Brescia, Part
of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The FinancialCrisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C.

L. REV. 617 (2009). Under the CRA, federal agencies conditioned merger approvals on banks meeting
local credit needs. Banks' success on this score was determined by a federal regulatory scorecard. But

crucially, the benchmarks for local credit needs were both flexible standards, and were subject to debate
by local community groups themselves. Where these groups were well-organized, they leveraged their
ability to trigger federal inspections and potentially reduce local banks' CRA score (which would
undermine lucrative merger approvals) to force banks to negotiate more directly, and in some cases, create

entirely new programs to pro-actively address the credit needs of minority neighborhoods. These levers
were, however, gradually dismantled, and the power and influence of local groups were reduced.
210. See generally, e.g., Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards
Enforcement Through Partnershipwith Workers' Organizations,38 POLICY & SOCIETY 552 (2010).
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Representation, Participation,and Mobilization

The idea of expanding interest representation in the administrative state
is an old one. Norton Long described such bureaucratic representation as
early as 1952, suggesting that the power and authority of agencies would
likely not be undone, and instead could be legitimated and directed through
dedicated offices that represented the interests of affected constituenciesor through the civil service itself which, by virtue of its democratic and
meritocratic nature, drew personnel from the ranks of the ordinary public.211
Long's central point was that agencies could be "representative" even in the
absence of conventional electoral mechanisms.212 A few decades later,
Richard Stewart, backed by the power of judicial review, famously-if
ambivalently--explored the prospects of interest representation in
administrative agencies. 2 13 Even as other scholars have explored more
participatory and collaborative models of interest representation,214 a running
tension in imagining more democratic and balanced participation in
administrative decision-making is the clash between plebiscitarian or direct
democratic participation on the one hand, and delegated, representative
models on the other.2 15 In some ways, measures to engage interest groups in
policymaking presume (often mistakenly) that these interest groups will be
more internally representative and participatory.2 16
But representation, participation, and the mobilization of countervailing
power are closely interrelated, and hard to disentangle in practice.
Conceptually, we can understand representation not only as a delegation of
authority from a principal to an agent, but also as a dynamic relationship
between representative and constituency that catalyzes and generates
mobilization around the relationship itself. Indeed, representative institutions
and representatives themselves are often the focal points around which
communities and constituencies orient their mobilization, debates, and
political participation. Institutions like the Oakland Commission, the RGB,
and the CFPB create a form of representation to help fuel a more sustained
degree of civil society mobilizing and organizing; this in turn links these
constituencies to levers of political power, even the absence of more direct
211. See Norton E. Long, Bureaucracyand Constitutionalism,46 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 808 (1952).
I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for pointing me towards Long's work in this regard.

212. Id
213.

Stewart, supra note 20.

214. For classic accounts of collaborative governance, see e.g. Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the AdministrativeState, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, A
Constitution ofDemocraticExperimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
215. See generally, e.g., Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs ofMass Participationfor

DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (noting critiques of participation and
suggesting the greater value of representative models).

216. See Seifter, supranote 41.
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democratic forms of participation.217 Furthermore, it is the fact that such
engagement is autonomous enough to generate adversarial and oppositional
pressure, but embedded enough to have actual influence on policy, that helps
make these administrative procedures an expression of countervailing
power. The central question from a power-building perspective, then, is not
necessarily the choice between 'representative' or 'participatory'
mechanisms, but rather a focus on thickening the relational-andpotentially
adversarial-interactionbetween policymakers on the one hand, and
constituencies on the other. The fact that these dynamic relationships
between constituencies and policymakers can be created through a variety of
institutional forms suggests a wider range of flexibility and possible
innovation in administrative institutions and processes aimed at facilitating
more such linkages.
2.

ContestationOver Consensus

Another crucial implication of these power-shifting institutional designs
lies in the relative autonomy and adversarial capacity of the stakeholder
groups involved. In several of the cases described in Part IV, the degree to
which otherwise disempowered constituencies-whether community
residents in Oakland, tenants in New York, or consumers in national
financial regulation-are able to exercise influence through the regulatory
process depends on their ability to toggle back and forth between stances of
collaboration and engagement on the one hand, and adversarial contestation
on the other. This autonomy to engage in more adversarial disagreement
when needed to generate pressure is vital for creating meaningful political
influence and power.
Furthermore, the importance of this contestatory nature of mobilization
provides an important amendment to existing discussions of participatory
and collaborative governance in the administrative state. For almost twenty
years, scholars have offered a variety of suggestions for how stakeholders
can be better empowered and engaged in regulatory policymaking under the
rubrics of "collaborative governance"1 or "new governance."218 Many of the
policy proposals in these accounts, such as greater stakeholder representation
and participatory monitoring of outcomes, align with the discussion above.
However, these accounts tend to gloss over the necessary role that power and
conflict play in creating truly equitable and inclusive processes. In contrast
to these accounts, the goal for a power-shifting institutional design should
not be to optimize a policy process for efficiency, efficacy, or consensus;

217.

For a fuller theorization of this "mobilizational conception of representation," see, e.g., Disch

supra note 198; Urbinati & Warren, supra note 82; see also Rehfeld, supra note 161.
218. See FREEMAN & MINOW supra note 190.
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rather it should be, in classic Madisonian fashion, to facilitate a productive
form of contestation and disagreement.2 19
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR POWER IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
This paper began with noting the resurgence of interest in questions of
political power and institutional design. The arguments developed in this
paper build on this revived interest, offering a way to conceptualize power
particularly in reference to the linkages between institutions on the one hand
and constituencies on the other. By designing institutions to deepen these
linkages, we can help marginalized communities expand their ability to
mobilize, organize, and exercise influence. By bringing together a focus on
social movements and organizing on the one hand with an attention to
administrative institutions and processes on the other, the arguments above
suggest some implications for thinking about power not just in public law
scholarship, but in related fields-particularly law and social movements,
and the study of administrative law at various levels.
1.

What Law and Social Movements Can Learn from Administrative

Theory
There is of course a robust literature on law and social movements. Much
of this literature highlights the ways in which grassroots movements have
influenced major court cases, shaping the path of law-making and meaningmaking. 220 But as the above accounts of power-building and administrative
process suggest, social movement scholars and practitioners alike would do
well to broaden their focus to also encompass the interactions between social
movements and administrative institutions. Like courts, administrative
institutions are another arena in which law and norms are constructed-and
like courts, they present a particular configuration of openness to pressure

219. On the distinction between collaborative and contestatory forms of participation, see
RAIMAN, supra note 11, at 105-09. For a critique of collaborative governance and its relative silence
with regards to disparities of power, see e.g., Amy Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on
Reason and Rules, OrganizationandLaw, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 357 (2010); Amy Cohen, Negotiation, Meet
New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 503 (2008); Cristie Ford, New
Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty:Lessons from FinancialRegulation 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 441
(2010) (using case studies of new governance approaches in financial regulation to argue that
conventional views of collaborative governance pay insufficient attention to the need to better
institutionalize countervailing power); David Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law 157 PA. L. Rev. 541 (2008) (making a similar
argument in context of poverty law).
220. See generally, Suzanna B. Goldberg, Obergefell at the Intersection of Civil Rights and Social
Movements, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRcurr 157 (2015); Thalia Gonzalez, A Quiet Revolution: Mindfulness,
Rebellious Lawyering, and Community Practice,53 CAL. W. L. REv. 49 (2016); Lani Guinier & Gerald
Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence ofLaw and Social Movements, 123 YALE
L.J. 2740 (2014).
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and contestation, and insulation from politics. For social movements to
exercise greater political influence and power, they will necessarily have to
develop a degree of sophistication around engaging administrative
processes-much like the grassroots movements for equitable development
in Oakland, or the push for federal consumer financial protection after the
financial crisis.
Furthermore, the discussion above about power-building and the role of
institutional structures in generating greater leverage for grassroots
constituencies represents an important addition to existing discussions of law
and organizing. As Scott Cummings suggests, "law and organizing"
represents a new focus for the law and social movements literature, focusing
less on lawyers, litigation, and mobilization, and more on the building of
long-term civil society organization, capacity, and leadership.22 1 Engaged in
the tradition of community organizing running from Saul Alinksy to Cesar
Chavez to the civil rights and welfare rights movements, this view of
organizing emphasizes the building of durable, long-term relationships,
leaders, and capacity, as a foundation for political power. This turn to
organizing tracks with important developments in social science, which
similarly suggests the importance of relational organizing, mass
constituency-building civil society organization, and autonomous grassroots
capacity as preconditions for long-term political power.2 22 To these
discussions of organizing strategy, the above discussion highlights the
importance of institutionalcontext and institutional reform. The preceding

sections imply that movements will be more able to organize durable
coalitions and constituencies when they have footholds in institutions that
enable them to exercise actual power. Furthermore, it suggests that
organizing groups should actively prioritize pushing for reforms that
multiply these footholds-even if that means deferring or delaying a more
immediate substantive policy goal. For example, it is one thing to win a oneoff wage increase, and quite another to win an institutional change that
structurally shifts power towards workers, making many substantive claims
more possible in the future.223
This in turn suggests that community organizers themselves will have to
build organizations, leaders, and skillsets suited to engaging in these
institutional arenas--creating a repertoire of action that goes beyond the
221. See Scott Cummings & Ingrid Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and Organizing,48 UCLA
L. REV. 443, 447 (2001).
222. See, e.g., HAN, supra note 178; see also THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM
MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN CIVIC LIFE (2004) (arguing that historically, the shift away from mass
member constituency-building organizing to favor professionalized lobbying and advocacy groups in the
late 20th century represented a key driver of the concentration of political power away from ordinary
Americans in favor of less accountable and responsive interest group elites).
223. See FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION, supra note 197.
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articulation of grievance and advocacy, to the ability to share in the actual
business of governing. This is not an automatic or costless transition, but it
is essential to enabling civil society groups to make full use of the kinds of
inclusionary strategies discussed above. Furthermore, it is a transition that is
increasingly front-of-mind for organizers and advocates themselves., 22 4
Indeed, in the Oakland case for example, this shift to engaging in governance
represented a deliberate and not altogether simple transition in mindset and
strategy on the part of the organizing coalition, EBASE. 225 This growing
interest among advocacy leaders in actual governance may reflect in part the
policy successes these groups have had in recent years at the local level.
These successes arise, in part, from favorable relationships with progressive
mayors, and until recently, at the federal level through greater access to
policymakers under the Obama administration. But, this growing interest
also represents an important conceptual leap. While scholars and
practitioners alike have noted the systematic ways in which policy can
dismantle the power of civil society groups-most glaringly in context of the
conservative assault on labor organizing2 6 -this shift suggests a move to the
opposite project, of building grassroots power through a more direct
engagement with the design and operation of governance institutions.
Indeed, by creating greater power and institutionalizing a connection to
governance bodies, these strategies might make it more possible for these
constituencies to protect, defend, and extend the substantive policy gains.
2.

What Administrative Theory Can Learnfrom Movements

If the preceding sections offer implications for organizer-practitioners
and law and social movement scholars, there are parallel implications worth
noting for administrative law, regulatory theory, and public law.
First, the discussion above suggests it is worth revisiting some areas of
administrative law and institutional design debate that had been left behind
for a time. Richard Stewart's seminal article on interest representation
presented it as an attempt by courts to systematically expand the
representation of affected interests through doctrines of due process,
standing, and statutory participation rights. 227 This project was itself a
response to growing concerns about agency capture and skepticism of the
224.

On this shift from "grievance to governance," see, e.g., Jodeen Olguin-Taylor, From

Grievanceto Governance: 8 Features of Transformative Campaigns, MOVEMENT STRATEGY CTR. (Jan.
26,
2016),
http://letstalkmovementbuilding.org/grievance-govemance-8-features-transformativecampaigns/.
225. See EBASE, supra note 131; see also Rahman, The Key to Making Economic Development
More Equitable, supra note 130.
226. See, e.g., HACKER & PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS supra note 4.
227. See generally Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, supra note 18 at 1428-43;
Stewart, supra note 20, at 1717-56.
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capacities of publicly-spirited regulators. 2 28 But while even advocates of
such interest representation like Stewart saw it as a failed policy, more likely
to create gridlock and magnify the influence of sophisticated interests rather
than creating genuine accountability and participation, 2 29 this rejection was
premature. Interest representation fell short due to limited institutional tools
for constructing the contestation, inclusion, and participation necessary to be
productive and effective. Armed with a wider array of institutional
innovations and strategies-and understanding that effective power-shifting
cannot be achieved by the illusion of "perfect" institutions but rather though
a combination of institutions interacting with civil society organizing-can
offer renewed hope for the democratic potential of institutional design and
process reform.
Second, this focus on power-building offers an additional set of tools and
concepts that can inform persisting anxieties about regulatory capture and
failure. 230 The risks of capture, or more simply, lax and unresponsive
regulation, is even greater at the state and local level. For some scholars,
judicial review of the administrative process has, at times in the past, served
as a mode of facilitating internal administrative checks and balances, and
could potentially do so again by prioritizing fair and inclusive processes in
its review of agency action. 231 Others have emphasized presidential
oversight, and in particular, expertise and rationality-enhancing checks like
cost-benefit analysis, as a way to make policymaking more deliberative and
neutral.2 32 Still others have highlighted the importance of designing agencies
to be more insulated and independent from political pressure.233 The
arguments in this paper suggest the potential value of centering power, social
movements, and the ways in which institutional structures can alter the
dynamics of power and participation. In addition to conventional responses
of increasing insulation or "expertise-forcing" requirements on agencies

228.

Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, supra note 18, at 1398-1428; Merrill, supra

note 20 at 1040 (arguing that judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s worked to push agencies to expand
representation and participation of stakeholder interests in shaping regulatory policies). See generally
Schiller, Enlargingthe AdministrativePolity, supra note 18, at 1415-43; Stewart, supra note 20, at 1713-

56.
229.

Stewart, supra note 20, at 1670.

230. For a recent discussion of modem forms of regulatory capture and possible solutions, see
Schwarcz, supra note 106, at 365.
231. Michaels, Of ConstitutionalCustodiansand Regulatory Rivals, supranote 12, at 274-78; see
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Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 263, 263 (2015).
233.

See generally Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional

Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).

Policymaking as Power-Building

2018]

373

through rationality review or its equivalents,2 34 agency capture can be
checked by the countervailing power institutions and processes described
above.
Third, these principles of power-building and institutional design can
also contribute to some of our persisting anxieties about agency authority,
action, and inaction. The unease with regulatory authority often takes on the
language of constitutionalism, whether in appeals to due process or in the
appeals to principles of the separation of powers as the safeguard for
individual liberty. 235 By contrast, this focus on power and institutional
structure takes this concern with the constitutional and legal process values
of inclusion, participation, contestation, and liberty and directs it into very
different institutional mechanisms.
Indeed, many of today's anxieties about federal administrative power
stem from the peculiar lack of intra-executive countervailing power in an era
where external checks in the form of Congressional or judicial review are
somewhat thin. Thus, in the later years of the Obama administration, many
administrative law scholars suggested the need for, but expressed very real
legal and normative problems with, agencies stretching statutory authorities
to address pressing policy problems in an era of Congressional recalcitrance
and gridlock.236 Yet with the election of Donald Trump and the return of
single-party control in Washington, the problem of agency overreach took a
different valence, still raising anxieties about overly-powerful administrative
bodies making policy decisions without adequate safeguards. What this
whiplash indicates (beyond the see-saw of partisan fortunes in Washington)
is a stark reality. In eras of divided government, where one party controls the
White House and the other the Congress, it is likely that agencies will stretch
their statutory authorities to the breaking point, to drive policy forward, on
the expectation that the opposing party in Congress will do everything they
can to limit policy "victories" for the President's party. By contrast, in an era
of unified government, it is likely that agencies will again power forward,
this time with the tacit backing of Congress. This is likely true regardless of
234.

See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
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which party occupies which branch of government, and is a function of both
the reality that the separation of powers is mediated by party politics 2 37and
the current era of extreme party polarization. In either scenario, it seems
possible that Federal policymaking would benefit from greater checks and
balances within the Executive in light of the limitations of Congressional
checks, and given the likelihood of judicial deference in many instances of
ordinary policymaking.2 38
Fourth, just as engaging with the administrative process requires
movements and organizers to adopt new capacities and strategies, it also
demands a very different set of skills and personnel than what we usually
associate with administrative bodies. We need to invest in government
capacity, not just to make and administer policies, but also to design, deploy,
and manage these inclusionary, representative, and participatory strategies.
Managing interfaces like the CFPB Community Affairs unit or the Oakland
Commission requires significant investment and expertise on the part of the
conveners, 239 designing representative and participatory mechanisms,
providing briefings for the participants on the relevant data and issues, and
facilitating discussion to lead to concrete, usable recommendations.
Policymakers, whether at the federal, state, or local level, tend not to invest
in these skills or tasks. To fully harness the potential of institutional design
and policymaking for building countervailing power, this will have to
change.240
Finally, the arguments of this paper suggest that taking a broader view
of the subjects of administrative law scholarship can help yield new insights.
Some of the most compelling experiments with new administrative processes
and institutional designs have occurred at the state and local level, as Part
IV.B above suggests. In keeping with the revival of interest in state and local
administrative law,24 1 this paper suggests that state and local institutions
offer valuable sources of insight and experimentation. Local government law
scholars in particular have offered important accounts revisiting questions of
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power, institutional structure, and participation.242 These links between local
government and administrative law scholarship are thus worth drawing out
more in future work.
3.

Power, Inequality, and Public Law

As noted above, our current concerns about economic inequality and
disparities of political power are intertwined. The ideas in this paper suggest
that as we consider the substantive legal and policy changes needed to tackle
the current crisis of economic inequality,243 we must also consider
institutional and process reforms aimed at mitigating political inequalities.
In a sense, these strategies are content and context-neutral-they can be
deployed in a variety of policy areas. As we have seen above, power-shifting
institutional designs can be baked into economic development policies, and
financial regulations alike. Similar designs might be incorporated into other
areas of law too, from criminal justice reform to labor law. 24
But in another sense, these principles are not neutral at all. Indeed, they
are very much directed towards prioritizing and lifting up particular
constituencies and stakeholders. Our choice of which policy areas to apply
these tools, and which groups to empower in these ways are necessarily
morally and normatively-tinged, to some degree informed by our view of
which interests are worth privileging. But they also respond to a very real
and objective reality that not all civil society groups are equally influentialand that our presumptions about the fairness and legitimacy (not to mention,
durability) of public policies often presume without sufficient basis a level
political playing field.
This ambiguity may be troubling to some, but it is also largely
unavoidable. To the extent that we see a genuine disparity of political power,
and see that disparity in turn fueling economic policies that widen inequality
in normatively troubling ways, these tools above can offer some guidance
for how to develop not just substantive policies in response, but also
countervailing power capable of defending those policies and facilitating
more equality-enhancing policies in the future.
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VII. CONCLUSION: POWER AND POPULAR ADMINISTRATION
"The administrative process," proclaimed James Landis in 1938, "is, in
essence our generation's answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and
legislative process."24 5 One of the architects of the New Deal and the newlyminted Security and Exchange Commission (which he would later chair),
Landis depicted the turn to expert regulation as a necessary revolution in
American governance, given the complexities of modern policymaking and
the limits of interest group politics and archaic legal doctrines.2" 6 While few
today would share Landis' unabashed faith in the superiority and infallibility
of technocratic expertise, we find ourselves drawn into a similar position.
Across different policy domains, the reach and importance of the regulatory
agency has never been greater. Agencies continue to play a critical role in
providing expertise in devising and implementing complex policy schemes.
But agencies are also increasingly serving as critical "gap-fillers", stepping
into the policy and political voids created by sudden crises, congressional
gridlock, and changing social and economic conditions. The regulatory state,
for better or worse, continues to assert itself as a corrective to the
inadequacies of the constitutional branches.
Today Landis seems both prescient and nave-we are indeed
increasingly dependent on regulatory agencies to do the heaviest lifting when
it comes to policymaking and addressing changing social and economic
conditions; but we also have very little faith in their ability to do so and serve
the public good. This paper suggests one possible pathway forward: like
Landis, I have suggested above that regulatory agencies can in fact help
overcome failures of existing political processes. But instead of Landis' faith
in expertise, I have argued above that it is the democratic potential of the
regulatory process that gives rise to this potential. Regulatory agencies have
the (under-utilized) potential to house and foster a more inclusive,
empowered form of participation and engagement-mitigating disparities of
political power. In so doing, regulation can also serve as an arena where
constituencies can engage with the realities of policymaking, and share in
the task of self-governance.24 7 As with popular constitutionalism, this
concept of popular administration is both a descriptive and a normative one.
It is descriptive in that it highlights a strand of administrative law theory and
practice that often goes overlooked-the ways in which regulatory agencies
have at times worked to foster more direct forms of interest representation,
JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938).
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participation, and civic empowerment. It is normative in that it suggests that
this inclusionary vision of regulation ought to be the ideal towards which
regulatory reform should strive.
This normative aspiration is made all the more vital by the realities of
our current democratic deficits and the very real disparities of political power
and influence. In recent years a growing body of research has highlighted the
ways in which our electoral and legislative systems are deeply unresponsive
and uninclusive. Popular administration is not a substitute for addressing
these defects. But it is an important complement to legislative and electoral
democracy-and an often overlooked arena in which reformers and citizens
alike can attempt to gain a greater foothold in the political process.
The potential here is vast. From community development initiatives
designed by agencies like HUD, to the promotion of financial inclusion
through the CFPB, to the design of new labor laws for the 21St century by
Department of Labor, there are a variety of major public policy challenges,
each of which implicate important and diverse constituencies who are not
usually best represented through conventional geographic electoral districts
or legislative lobbying. State and local administrative bodies also govern vast
swaths of our social and economic lives, from housing, to the safety net, to
workplace safety, to basic health and police powers, and have perhaps even
greater plasticity to be adapted into more power-balancing processes and
institutional forms. While power continues to shape the dynamics of
governance and regulation, through regulation we might help rebalance these
disparities, and in so doing create new types of democratic experience,
participation, and self-governance.
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